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Abstract 
American administrative law is grounded in a conception of the rela- 
tionship between reviewing courts and agencies modeled on the relationship 
between appeals courts and trial courts in civil litigation. This appellate 
review model was not an inevitable foundation of administrative law , but it 
has had far-reaching consequences , and its origins are poorly understood. 
This Article details how the appellate review model emerged after 1 906 as an 
improvised response by the U.S. Supreme Court to a political crisis brought 
on by aggressive judicial review of decisions of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. Once the jerry-built model was in place , Congress signaled its 
approval, and an academic - -John Dickinson - wrote a persuasive book ex- 
tolling its virtues. As a result , the appellate review model became ntrenched 
by the 1 920s and eventually spread to all of administrative law. The early 
adoption of the appellate review model helps explain why the Supreme Court 
never seriously grappled with Article III problems created by the widespread 
use of administrative agencies to adjudicate cases once the New Deal and the 
expansion of the administrative state arrived. It also helps explain why the 
judiciary has played such a large role in the development ofadministrative 
policy in the United States relative to other legal systems. 
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Introduction 
Modern administrative law is built on the appellate review model of 
the relationship between reviewing courts and agencies. The model was 
borrowed from the understandings that govern the relationship between 
appeals courts and trial courts in civil litigation - which in turn were de- 
rived from the relationship between judge and jury. The appellate review 
model, as developed in the civil litigation context, has three salient fea- 
tures1: (1) The reviewing court decides the case based exclusively on the 
evidentiary record generated by the trial court. If the reviewing court 
determines that additional evidence is critical to a proper decision, it will 
remand to the trial court for development of a new record but will not 
take evidence itself. (2) The standard of review applied by the reviewing 
court varies depending on whether the issue falls within the area of supe- 
rior competence of the reviewing court or the trial court. (3) The key 
variable in determining the division of competence is the law-fact distinc- 
tion. The trial court, which hears the witnesses and makes the record, is 
assumed to have superior competence to resolve questions of fact; the 
reviewing court is presumed to have superior competence to resolve ques- 
tions of law.2 
1. See generally Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority 
Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the 
Judge /Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 993 (1986) (describing 
process of appellate review). 
2. See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231-33 (1991) (summarizing 
reasons for law-fact distinction in civil litigation context); Henry P. Monaghan, 
Constitutional F ct Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229, 234 (1985) [hereinafter Monaghan, 
Review] (observing that "the categories of law and fact have traditionally served an 
important regulatory function in distributing authority among various decisionmakers in 
the legal system"). Of course, the exact line of division between law and fact will often be 
disputed and will shift over time and from one context o the next. For example, the 
question whether applications of law to fact (sometimes called questions of ultimate fact or 
mixed questions of law and fact) are primarily for the initiating or reviewing institution has 
been answered differently in different contexts. Louis, supra note 1, at 1002-07. See 
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The body of jurisprudence we know as administrative law is 
grounded in the same division of institutional authority. Here too, the 
reviewing court conceives of its role vis-a-vis the administrative agency in 
terms of the conventions that govern the appeals court-trial court rela- 
tionship. The decision of the reviewing court (with rare exceptions) is 
based exclusively on the record generated by the agency. If additional 
evidence is needed, the reviewing court will remand to the agency for the 
development of a new record rather than undertake to find the facts it- 
self. The standard of review, again, is based on conventional understand- 
ings of relative competence. And those understandings, in turn, are 
grounded in the law-fact distinction. The agency, which gathers evidence 
and makes the record, is understood to have superior competence to re- 
solve questions of fact, whether adjudicative facts specific to particular 
parties or legislative facts of more widespread significance. The reviewing 
court is characterized as having superior competence to resolve questions 
about the meaning of the law. 
Going further, we can say that the great preponderance of what we 
today regard as administrative law - the material that is found in adminis- 
trative law casebooks - consists of an elaboration of the implications of 
the appellate review model.3 The many intricacies involving the stan- 
dards of review that courts apply in resolving challenges to agency action 
employ the same vocabulary used in civil litigation: "contrary to law," 
"substantial evidence," "arbitrary and capricious," "clearly erroneous," 
generally Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1139-40 (2011) 
(documenting shift in standard of review applied by Second Circuit o mixed questions of 
law and fact in response to increased caseload); Eric Schnapper, Judges Against Juries - 
Appellate Review of Federal Civil Jury Verdicts, 1989 Wis. L. Rev.- 237 (documenting trend 
in federal courts after 1968 toward more aggressive appellate review of jury verdicts). 
Nevertheless, wherever the line is drawn, the result is justified by declaring that he issue is 
either one "of fact" (for the initiating institution) or "of law" (for the reviewing 
institution). Id. at 299-301 (suggesting determination f whether issue is of "fact" or "law," 
and resulting level of deference, may have been responding to desired judicial outcome 
rather than determinative of it); see also Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in 
Administrative Law, 74 Geo. L.J. 1, 9-14 (1985) (articulating distinctions between law and 
fact in administrative context). 
3. Commentators continually complain about the emphasis on the court-agency 
relationship in administrative law. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Administrative Law in 
Transition: ADiscipline in Search of an Organizing Principle, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 120, 129 
(1977) (noting "administrative law is not really . . . primarily concerned with the 
administrative system itself; rather, its focus is on a set of principles that courts utilize in 
determining whether and to what extent agency decisions should be scrutinized"); Edward 
Rubin, It's Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 Cornell L. 
Rev. 95, 137-46 (2003) (arguing APA concentrates ona judicial model of governance and 
judicial review to exclusion of other perspectives); G. Edward White, Allocating Power 
Between Agencies and Courts: The Legacy of Justice Brandeis, 1974 Duke L.J. 195, 196 
(describing "conventional wisdom" that "most administrative lawissues can be viewed as 
revolving around the allocation of power between administrative agencies and reviewing 
courts" (footnote omitted)). 
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and so forth.4 Modern administrative law also tracks civil litigation in 
devoting enormous energy to questions about the availability and timing 
of review. All of this lore operates in a conceptual universe grounded in 
an analogy to institutions in civil litigation. Indeed, these issues are 
largely resolved in terms of concepts - like jurisdiction, sovereign immu- 
nity, cause of action, standing, finality, and ripeness - that are direcdy 
borrowed from civil litigation. 
Although we take it for granted today, the adoption of the appellate 
review model as a central orienting principle of American administrative 
law was by no means inevitable. In the nineteenth century, courts en- 
gaged in what Jerry Mashaw has characterized as "bipolar" oversight of 
administrative action5: Either courts would review administrators' actions 
under one of the prerogative writs such as mandamus or habeas corpus, 
or there was no judicial review at all, with aggrieved claimants relegated 
either to filing internal complaints with the agency or petitioning 
Congress for relief.6 Not until the early decades of the twentieth century 
did courts embrace the salient features of the appellate review model, 
which allowed decisional authority to be shared between agencies and 
courts. Insofar as federal courts are concerned,7 the appellate review 
model first emerged in full blown form in the context of judicial review of 
orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) around 1910. The 
model spread from there to other contexts, including review of orders of 
the Federal Trade Commission. The appellate review model was fully en- 
4. See, e.g., Allentown Mack Sales 8c Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 366-67 (1998) 
("We must decide whether [the Labor Board's] conclusion is supported by substantial 
evidence on the record as a whole. Put differently, we must decide whether on this record 
it would have been possible for a reasonable jury to reach the Board's conclusion." 
(citations omitted)). See generally Louis, supra note 1 (noting the close parallels in 
standards of review in civil litigation and administrative law); Robert L. Stern, Review of 
Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 70, 
71 (1944) (noting that "the formulas invoked in describing the functions of the reviewing 
court in the two fields ound very much alike"). 
5. Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and 
Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801-1829, 116 Yale L.J. 1636, 1736 (2007) 
[hereinafter Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists]. 
6. See Frederic P. Lee, The Origins of Judicial Control of Federal Executive Action, 
36 Geo. L.J. 287, 287 (1948) (discussing development of judicial review of administrative 
orders); Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist 
Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 Yale L.J. 1256, 1334-37 (2006) [hereinafter Mashaw, 
Federalist Foundations] (discussing judicial review during Federalist era via common law 
actions) . See generally Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action - A 
Revisionist History, 43 Admin. L. Rev. 197 (1991) (setting forth de novo, res judicata, and 
error models of judicial review in the nineteenth century). 
7. I have not systematically examined state court decisions of the later nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries to determine whether the adoption of the appellate review model 
occurred in state law before federal law. This is a nontrivial possibility, given that many 
state systems, unlike the federal system, used the writ of certiorari toreview agency action. 
Certiorari entailed calling for the record generated by a subordinate ribunal, and thus 
would entail a potential precursor to the appellate review model. 
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trenched before the onset of the New Deal and was later incorporated 
into the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946. It continues to be the 
cornerstone of administrative law today. 
Indeed, the appellate review model is so thoroughly embedded in 
contemporary administrative law that modern lawyers take it for granted. 
Perhaps as a consequence, the story of how American administrative law 
came to embrace the appellate review model is poorly understood. This 
gap in collective knowledge about the origins of modern administrative 
law has had at least two unfortunate consequences. 
First, it has distorted the modern debate about the constitutionality 
of adjudication by federal administrative agencies. Article III confers the 
"judicial power of the United States" on federal courts with judges who 
enjoy life tenure and secure compensation.8 There is no suggestion in 
Article III that Congress might create federal tribunals that do not enjoy 
life tenure and secure compensation - like administrative agencies - and 
confer authority on these tribunals to decide cases and controversies 
under federal law. How then do we square adjudication on a mass scale 
by administrative agencies with the text of Article III? 
The discussion of this question typically starts with the Supreme 
Court's 1932 decision in Crowell v. Benson , which upheld agency adjudica- 
tion of workmen's compensation claims against an Article III challenge.9 
Crowell reasoned that Article III is satisfied as long as all questions of law 
and key "jurisdictional" facts are subject to de novo review by an Article 
III court. Otherwise, ordinary, "nonjurisdictional" facts can be resolved 
by the agency, subject to deferential review by the Article III court, just as 
fact issues are resolved by juries or masters in chancery in civil litigation.10 
Modern commentators are divided over whether appellate review of ad- 
ministrative adjudication does in fact solve the Article III problem. They 
have also been puzzled by the casual, almost offhand way in which the 
Court in Crowell agreed that most fact-finding authority could be given 
over to non-Article III tribunals. 
Recovering the early history of the appellate review model allows us 
to understand why one of the most significant constitutional questions 
posed by the rise of the modern administrative state was never seriously 
deliberated by the Supreme Court. As we shall see, the appellate review 
model was adopted twenty years before the decision in Crowell. Not sur- 
prisingly, therefore, all participatingjustices in the case regarded the con- 
8. Article III also gives Congress discretion as to whether to create any lower federal 
courts and thus is plausibly read as allowing state courts to adjudicate cases and 
controversies arising under federal law. U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 1; see Henry M. Hart, Jr., 
The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in 
Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1363-64, 1401 (1953) (noting state courts are generally 
available to enforce federal aw even if Congress declines to create, or limits, the 
jurisdiction of lower federal courts) . 
9. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
10. Id. at 51-54. 
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stitutionality of agency adjudication of fact issues - at least those clearly 
within the agency's jurisdiction - as settled. This accounts for the cursory 
discussion of the Article III problem in the decision. We will also see how 
the concern that arose with Crowell - taking away or diluting the authority 
of Article III courts and giving it over to non-Article III tribunals - was 
largely invisible in the years when the appellate review model emerged 
and solidified. Courts in the decades preceding Crowell were more con- 
cerned with schemes that injected courts into matters that were not prop- 
erly judicial but were rather "administrative" in nature.11 The appellate 
review model - which cast Article III courts in the familiar role of review- 
ing records made by other tribunals and resolving questions of law - 
came to be seen as solving this danger of "contamination" of the judicial 
power by involvement in matters of administration. 
A second and even more far-reaching consequence of collective ig- 
norance about the origins of the appellate review model is that it has 
obscured the possibility of alternative paths for American administrative 
law - including alternatives that would give reviewing courts much less 
influence over the formation of policy. Prior to the advent of the appel- 
late review model, when American courts reviewed administrative action, 
they did so in original actions like mandamus, habeas corpus, or officer 
suits.12 Unlike the appellate review model, which confers general author- 
ity on reviewing courts to decide all questions of law, review under these 
actions tended to focus on whether the agency was acting within the 
scope of its jurisdiction. This, in turn, tended to restrict judicial interven- 
tion to executive action lacking any legal authority and discouraged judi- 
cial micromanagement of matters clearly falling within the scope of 
agency jurisdiction. Significantly, English administrative law, and by ex- 
tension the administrative law in most commonwealth countries, contin- 
ued to evolve in the twentieth century from the ultra vires model.13 Only 
in the United States did administrative law embrace the appellate review 
model, with the result that U.S. administrative law came to be character- 
ized by much more aggressive intervention by courts - with unpredictable 
and often chaotic effects - relative to the administrative law of other 
countries sharing a common legal tradition. 
This Article seeks to fill the gap in collective awareness about the 
origins of the appellate review model as the foundational principle of 
modern administrative law. Part I describes the nineteenth-century un- 
derstanding of administrative law, including the all-or-nothing nature of 
judicial review. Part II describes the controversy over judicial review of 
railroad rate regulation that resulted in the enactment of the Hepburn 
11. See infra text accompanying otes 244-255. 
12. See generally Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 327-38 
(1965) (summarizing history). 
13. See Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the President's Statutory Powers, 62 
Vand. L. Rev. 1169, 1201 (2009) (quoting British judge's observation that ultra vires review 
remains the "central principle of [English] administrative law" (citation omitted)). 
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Act of 1906, the Supreme Court's efforts to find a path of retreat in the 
face of widespread political opposition to its prior practices, and the 
Court's improvisational development of the appellate review model as a 
solution to the dilemma it confronted. Part III considers post-Hepburn 
Act events, including the enactment of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act of 1914, which solidified the use of the appellate review model as a 
mode of court-agency relations. Part IV highlights the role of one partic- 
ular academic figure in rationalizing and legitimizing the appellate re- 
view model. John Dickinson's magisterial 1927 book, Administrative Justice 
and the Supremacy of Law , was a sustained panegyric to the appellate review 
model as the proper conception of the role of courts in the incipient 
administrative state.14 Dickinson's vision helped secure judicial accept- 
ance of the appellate review model for use in administrative law. 
Building on this historical account, Part V turns to the constitutional 
puzzle created by the now-widespread practice of using non-Article III 
federal agencies to adjudicate cases and controversies arising under fed- 
eral law. The critical point is that the tension perceived by modern com- 
mentators between the language of Article III and the use of non-Article 
III agencies to adjudicate disputes under federal law was largely invisible 
during the years when the appellate review model was adopted. The sep- 
aration of powers problem that troubled the Court during that era was 
whether judicial review of administrative action would draw courts into 
participating in decisions that were properly regarded as "executive" or 
"administrative." The fear voiced by modern commentators - dilution of 
federal judicial power by transferring jurisdiction to Article I agencies - 
emerged only later, by which time the appellate review model was too 
thoroughly entrenched to be questioned. 
Part VI considers why the appellate review model has been so re- 
markably successful. Created and nurtured by the courts, it soon won the 
endorsement of Congress, and has become a fundamental norm of ad- 
ministrative law that everyone takes for granted. Part of the reason for its 
success is its adaptability. The model has proven sufficiently flexible to 
permit either passive deference or aggressive substitution of judgment, 
depending on whether a court agrees with an agency's policy judgment 
and the court's perception of the agency's political support. It has also 
proven sufficiently capacious to accommodate significant shifts over time 
in the conception of the relevant functions of agencies and courts. Thus, 
as intellectual fashions about agency government have changed, the na- 
ture of judicial review has been able to change apace, without modifying 
the underlying architecture of court-agency relations. For example, 
when the problem of agency capture became the rage in the 1970s, 
courts were able to layer "hard look" review onto the existing structure of 
the appellate review model. And when deregulation became the fashion 
14. John Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the United 
States (1927). 
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in the 1980s, courts were able to rally around the Chevron doctrine, which 
in theory eliminated judicial authority to second guess reasonable agency 
interpretations of regulatory statutes, again without undoing the basic 
framework of judicial review.15 
I conclude with some thoughts about whether the appellate review 
model, although an unqualified success in terms of its capacity to survive, 
is in fact the best model for accommodating the respective roles of courts 
and agencies in the administrative state. With the benefit of a century of 
hindsight, I suggest that a model of review that built on the jurisdictional 
or ultra vires model - which became the foundation of administrative law 
in England and many commonwealth countries - might have served as a 
better foundational principle for American administrative law. The ques- 
tion for courts would have been "Does the agency have authority?," not 
"Is it the law?" This might have provided a better allocation of institu- 
tional roles than the appellate review model has bequeathed to us. 
I. Nineteenth-Century Background 
In the nineteenth century, government at the federal, state, and lo- 
cal levels unquestionably engaged in functions that today would be char- 
acterized as administrative. The federal government enforced embar- 
goes, disposed of massive quantities of public land, awarded invention 
patents, regulated trade with Indians, and collected tariffs and other 
forms of taxation.16 The states subsidized internal improvements and is- 
sued corporate charters.17 Local governments prohibited nuisances and 
engaged in land use regulation.18 These administrative functions were 
subject to judicial review to one degree or another. But there was no 
distinctive jurisprudence of administrative law. Courts looked to isolated 
pockets of precedent permitting judicial challenges to certain types of 
executive action, rather than generalizing across areas in an effort to 
identify higher order principles. 
Scholars have recendy begun to focus more closely on this "dark age 
of administrative law,"19 and have perceived discernable patterns at work. 
15. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 
(1984) ("[I]f the [regulatory] statute issilent or ambiguous . . . the question for the court 
is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction fthe statute."). 
16. See generally Mashaw, Federalist Foundations, upra note 6, at 1335 8c n.275 
(enumerating examples of early federal administrative functions). 
17. See Carter Goodrich, Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads: 
1800-1890, at 3-16, 51-120 (1960) ("All but a few of the state governments carried on 
their own programs of public improvements . . . ."); Oscar Handlin 8c Mary Flug Handlin, 
Commonwealth: A Study of the Role of Government in the American Economy: 
Massachusetts 1774-1861, at 53-56 (1947) (explaining how "beneficent hand of the 
state . . . reach [ed] out to touch every part of the economy"). 
18. See William J. Novak, The People's Welfare: Law 8c Regulation in Nineteenth- 
Century America 51-82 (1996) (describing active role of nineteenth-century local 
governments in regulating fire hazards and other public nuisances) . 
19. Woolhandler, supra note 6, at 198. 
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Ann Woolhandler, for example, has argued that one can detect three 
models of court-agency relations in nineteenth-century law: a "de novo" 
model, a "res judicata" model, and an emergent "error" model.20 Caleb 
Nelson has recently claimed that apparently divergent practices fall into 
place once one understands the nineteenth-century concept of public 
rights, and how public rights were regarded as entitled to litde or no 
judicial protection as compared with private rights.21 
In my view, the key to understanding nineteenth-century judicial re- 
view starts with the observation that administrative action could be re- 
viewed only through certain forms of action. As then-Assistant Professor 
Antonin Scalia observed, nineteenth-century judges had "great[ ] rever- 
ence for the integrity of the pleadings."22 Inherited English conventions 
as modified by American statutes and precedents often dictated the ap- 
propriate form of action. The form of action dictated the nature of the 
"review." With few exceptions, those forms dictated full blown trials, in 
which the court would develop its own record and apply independent 
judgment in resolving all issues of law and fact, in effect reviewing the 
agent's action de novo. Many forms dictated relatively narrow inquiries 
into whether the agent was acting within the scope of his authority or had 
violated a nondiscretionary legal duty, in which case the court limited 
review to whether the agency was acting within its jurisdiction. Still other 
forms, such as the use of ejectment in public land cases, required that the 
claimant establish the passage of title in order to bring the action. If this 
could not be shown, the matter corresponded to what we today would call 
unreviewable agency action.23 
Customs, revenue, and prize cases tended to be reviewed by tort ac- 
tions against the officer responsible for the taking.24 The officer would 
defend on the ground that his action was authorized by law. The court 
would then take evidence and rule on the defense, thereby providing ju- 
dicial review of the action. Because the officer suit was an original action 
filed in court, the record was necessarily developed by the court. The 
20. Id. at 200-01. 
21. Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 
563-64 (2007). 
22. Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal 
Administrative Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 
867, 885-86 (1970). 
23. See id. at 896 n.130 ("[S]o long as the legal tide remains in the government all 
questions of right should be solved by appeal to the land department and not to the 
courts." (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Brown v. Hitchcock, 173 U.S. 473, 477 
(1899))). 
24. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178-79 (1804) (holding 
commander of American warship "answerable in damages" for seizure of foreign ship 
without statutory authority) . For descriptions of early officer suits and some of the perils 
they presented, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts 
and the Federal System 841-69 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter Fallon et al., The Federal 
Courts]; Mashaw, Federalist Foundations, supra note 6, at 1325-31. 
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standard of review of both law and fact was one of independent 
judgment. 
Public land disputes were probably the largest class of federal admin- 
istrative action in the nineteenth century. Direct review of the decisions 
of the Lands Office was not available either by mandamus or injunction. 
If the court found that tide had not yet passed, the action failed and 
hence there was no review of the executive action, no matter how unlaw- 
ful it might be.25 If tide had passed from the government and a dispute 
arose between two rival claimants, the court would entertain a suit in 
ejectment to resolve the issue.26 Even in such an action, however, the 
court would treat any actions taken by the government prior to the trans- 
fer of tide as immune from collateral attack.27 Otherwise, as in the case 
of the officer suit, this was an original action in court. The record was 
developed by the court, and so the review - once the passage of title hur- 
dle was cleared - was de novo. 
In other circumstances claimants had to assert one of the prerogative 
writs inherited from English law. Mandamus is the best known. Marbury 
v. Madison , the most famous mandamus case of the nineteenth century, 
stressed that the writ would issue only when the claimant had a vested 
right and only when the officer violated a nondiscretionary legal duty.28 
Executive action, in its nature political or otherwise discretionary, could 
not be challenged by mandamus. Significantly, mandamus was also an 
original action, and hence if any factfinding was required, the court 
would find the facts for itself. In Marbury , for example, the Supreme 
Court, presented with an original petition for mandamus, conducted a 
brief investigation into the factual circumstances behind the withholding 
of William Marbury's judicial commission before it concluded that it 
lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ.29 So mandamus, although it was a 
very narrow form of review, was also de novo, and the court exercised 
independent judgment in determining whether a government official 
had violated a nondiscretionary duty. 
25. See Scalia, supra note 22, at 913-14 (acknowledging that "public-lands cases" 
constitute an "area[ ] of federal administration n which . . . judicial review is . . . based 
upon the assumption that a suit against the officer cannot constitute a suit against the 
sovereign"). For a discussion of the vast amount of nonrenewable public lands 
adjudication by the Lands Office, see Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists, supra note 5, at 
1717-27. 
26. See, e.g., Johnson v. Towsley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 72, 85 (1871) (noting if "legal tide 
has passed from the United States to one party, when ... it ought to go to another," the 
court will "compel [the party with the land] to convey the legal tide"). 
27. See Nelson, supra note 21, at 577-79 ("Once private individuals could claim 
vested rights in the land . . . the executive branch's authority to act conclusively ran out."). 
28. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For a brief review of Marbury' s role in the 
development of nineteenth-century mandamus law, see generally Thomas W. Merrill, 
Marbury v. Madison as the First Great Administrative Law Decision, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 
481 (2004). 
29. See Marbury , 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 142 (ordering witnesses sworn and their 
testimony taken); id. at 142-46 (summarizing testimony). 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 18:59:44 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2011] APPELLATE REVIEW MODEL 949 
Other prerogative writs played a role in nineteenth-century adminis- 
trative law, including prohibition, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and certi- 
orari.30 Only certiorari, under which the court was asked to review the 
action of an inferior judicial tribunal, called for the review of a record 
generated by an entity other than the court itself. Many states relied 
upon certiorari to review certain types of administrative action.31 Origi- 
nally certiorari was used only to test the jurisdiction of an inferior tribu- 
nal. But this broadened during the nineteenth century to include ques- 
tions of law and eventually the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
conclusions of law. Interestingly, one of the types of certiorari prescribed 
by the New York Civil Practice Act made explicit reference to the stan- 
dard of review that a court would use in reviewing the verdict of a jury;32 a 
glimmer of the appellate review model in the midst of what is otherwise a 
sea of de novo review. But certiorari was never used in the nineteenth 
century to review federal executive branch actions.33 
After Congress created federal question jurisdiction in 1875, federal 
courts began entertaining bills of equity that sought to enjoin allegedly 
unlawful administrative action.34 They did so on the theory that federal 
courts needed only a grant of jurisdiction, not a statutory cause of action, 
in order to exercise the powers of a court of equity in ruling on a request 
to enjoin agency action.35 These actions were also original actions in 
which the trial court developed the record. So review here was also de 
novo, both in terms of the record generated and the exercise of indepen- 
dent judgment by the court. 
The traditions surrounding these forms of action exerted a strong 
gravitational pull on the nineteenth-century judiciary. This is revealed in 
30. As summarized by Hart & Wechsler, "[t]he writ of prohibition is usually directed 
to an inferior judicial or quasrjudicial body, to bar it from exceeding its jurisdiction"; 
"[t]he writ of quo warranto isordinarily limited to testing the right to an office"; [t]he 
writ of habeas corpus is available to test the legality of official detention or custody"; and 
"[t]he writ of certiorari d rects a lower tribunal to certify its record to a superior court." 
Fallon et al., The Federal Courts, supra note 24, at 844 n.10. 
31. See Jaffe, supra note 12, at 165-76 (discussing evolution of certiorari inEngland 
and United States including use of the writ in states to review administrative decisions). 
32. See Ernst Freund, Administrative Powers over Persons and Property 283-84 
(1928) [hereinafter F eund, Administrative Powers] (discussing standard of review of New 
York Civil Practice Act § 1304: "whether there was any competent proof of all the facts 
necessary to be proved in order to authorize the making of the determination"). 
33. See Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From 
Murray's Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 Buff. L. Rev. 765, 802 (1986) (stating first 
attempt to secure judicial review of federal executive action by certiorari occurred in 
1913). 
34. See John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law injudicial Review, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 
113, 121-30 (1998) (explaining "1875 grant of jurisdiction" was read as authorizing federal 
equity courts to review administrative action without statutory or common law cause of 
action). 
35. See, e.g., Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 110-11 (1902) 
(holding federal court had power to review determination that material sent by U.S. mail 
was fraudulent without any specific statutory ight of review). 
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several ways. Consider first some cases involving disputed Mexican land 
grants in California. Congress enacted legislation providing that such dis- 
putes would be heard by a special commission, subject to a right of "ap- 
peal" to the federal district court in California.36 Notwithstanding this 
characterization of the nature of the relationship between the commis- 
sion and the court, the Supreme Court said it would not be "misled by a 
name, but [would] look to the substance and intent of the proceeding."37 
It concluded that the "appeal" would in fact be an original proceeding in 
which all issues of fact and law could be considered de novo. 
Similarly, when the Patent Act38 was revised to provide that findings 
by the patent office were to be given "prima facie" effect in subsequent 
judicial proceedings, this did not give rise to the development of an ap- 
pellate review or error model in patent cases. Instead, courts tended to 
treat invention patents like land patents. As in the land office cases, 
"courts were reluctant to interfere with proceedings that were pending 
before the agency."39 Once a patent issued, however, and litigation was 
brought to enforce a patent, issues going to the validity of the patent were 
effectively subject to de novo review by the courts. 
The creation in 1887 of the first major national regulatory agency, 
the Interstate Commerce Commission, reflected a similar pattern. The 
Interstate Commerce Act provided in section 16 that courts were to re- 
gard ICC orders as "prima facie evidence of the matters therein stated."40 
While this might suggest that courts should defer to the ICC's findings of 
fact, the inference ran in the opposite direction. By making ICC findings 
only prima facie evidence, the Act was read as endorsing the practice of 
taking additional evidence in court and having the court determine 
whether the prima facie evidence had been rebutted.41 The Act also de- 
36. An Act to Ascertain and Settle the Private Land Claims in the State of California, 
ch. 41, §§ 9-10, 9 Stat. 631, 632-33 (1851). 
37. United States v. Ritchie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 525, 534 (1854); see also Grisar v. 
McDowell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 363, 375 (1867) (discussing Ritchie and quoting same 
language) . 
38. Patent Act, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836) (current version at scattered sections of 35 
U.S.C. (2006)). 
39. Woolhandler, supra note 6, at 235 n.193 (citing Comm'r of Patents v. Whitely, 71 
U.S. (4 Wall.) 522 (1866)). 
40. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, § 16, 24 Stat. 379, 384-85. 
41. The principal consequence of the "prima facie evidence" provision was that it 
prevented outright judicial ratemaking. The Supreme Court instructed that when an 
order of the ICC was reversed, either for errors of law or because new evidence presented 
to the circuit court suggested an error of fact, the proper course ordinarily was to remand 
to the Commission, not for the court to determine for itself whether ates were 
unreasonable or discriminatory. See E. Tenn., Va. 8c Ga. Ry. Co. v. ICC, 181 U.S. 1, 26-27 
(1901) (holding law attributes prima facie effect o findings of fact by Commission, 
therefore courts hould correct errors of law but not reinvestigate facts) ; ICC v. Clyde S.S. 
Co., 181 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1901) (finding it is "duty of the courts . . . not to proceed to an 
original investigation of the facts which should have been passed upon by the commission, 
but to correct the error of law . . . and . . . remand the case to the commission"); Louisville 
& Nashville R.R. Co. v. Behlmer, 175 U.S. 648, 675-76 (1900) (holding evidence cannot be 
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nied ICC orders any self-enforcing effect. To enforce an order, the 
Commission had to go to federal court to secure an injunction compel- 
ling compliance with its order. Courts were conditioned to think of eq- 
uity proceedings as original actions. Not surprisingly, the lower federal 
courts uniformly ruled that in such a proceeding new evidence could be 
submitted by the carriers.42 This meant that often the record that deter- 
mined the validity of the ICC's order was the record made in court, not 
the one made before the Commission. Review was de novo, at least with 
respect to the identity of the record on which review was based. 
The Supreme Court confirmed this construction of the Act in 
ICC v. Alabama Midland Railway Co.43 The circuit court had taken new 
evidence and based on this record had reversed the Commission. The 
Commission appealed, claiming among other things that the lower courts 
had no jurisdiction to review the Commission's judgment on questions of 
fact, and were required to limit their review to questions of law.44 Speak- 
ing through Justice Shiras, the Court rejected the Commission's argu- 
ment, saying that it was "sufficiently answered" by referring to those provi- 
sions of the Act providing for review by an original action in equity.45 
Justice Harlan complained in dissent that the decision, together with 
others narrowly construing the powers of the ICC, "goes far to make that 
commission a useless body for all practical purposes."46 
As this brief survey suggests, the breadth of review of agency action 
in the nineteenth century varied, but the nature of the review was uni- 
formly what we would now call de novo, certainly as to the development 
of the record. The understanding that courts would develop the record 
for review exerted a powerful pull on the standard of review, and so the 
tenor of review even in statutory review cases was nearly always one of 
independent judgment. There was little rhetoric of deference, and even 
less evidence of it in practice. 
Academic literature from the era confirms this. Around the turn of 
the century, a small group of scholars devoted to the study of "administra- 
tion" began to emerge.47 Prominent here were Bruce Wyman of Harvard 
Law School, Frank Goodnow of Columbia (first in political science and 
weighed by Court where Commission "from the nature of its organization a d the duties 
imposed upon it by the statute, ispeculiarly competent to pass upon questions of fact of 
the character here arising"). 
42. See ICC v. Ala. Midland Ry. Co., 168 U.S. 144, 175 (1897) ("It has been uniformly 
held by the several Circuit Courts of Appeals . . . that they are not restricted tothe evidence 
adduced before the Commission . . . but that additional evidence may be put in by either 
party . . . ."). 
43. 168 U.S. 144 (1897). 
44. Id. at 174. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 176 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
47. See generally William C. Chase, The American Law School and the Rise of 
Administrative Government 47-71 (1982) (discussing scholarship of Freund, Goodnow, 
and Wyman). 
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then at the Law School), and Ernest Freund of the University of Chicago 
(again starting in political science and migrating over to the Law School). 
The early work of these scholars was devoted to the constitutional status 
and internal organization of administrative bodies.48 They had little to 
say about judicial review. To the extent they addressed the subject at all, 
they did so by reviewing the various forms of action in which review was 
possible in the nineteenth century.49 None of them discussed the possi- 
bility of what I have called the appellate model of review, or any other 
conception of sharing of decisional authority between agencies and 
courts.50 The straightforward explanation is that a body of law based on 
the model of the judge-jury relationship did not exist at that time and was 
beyond the imagination of these scholars. 
In short, in the nineteenth century, either a court had authority to 
review administrative action or not, and if it did, it decided the whole 
case.51 There was nothing that could be described as a general jurispru- 
dence of administrative law. Judges and lawyers thought primarily in 
terms of different forms of action that might provide an avenue for chal- 
lenging particular agency action. The nature of judicial review, if any, 
48. See generally Ernst Freund, The Police Power, Public Policy and Constitutional 
Rights (1904) [hereinafter F eund, The Police Power] (discussing scope of police power 
under federal and state law); Frank Johnson Goodnow, The Principles of the 
Administrative Lawof the United States (1905) (detailing powers of various administrative 
bodies); Bruce Wyman, The Principles of the Administrative Law Governing the Relations 
of Public Officers (1903) (describing administrative law governing relations of public 
officers) . 
49. See generally Frank J. Goodnow, The Writ of Certiorari, 6 Pol. Sci. Q. 493 (1891) 
(discussing history of writ of certiorari and how New York and other state courts had begun 
to enlarge on it as a device for controlling administrative discretion). 
50. Wyman broadly defines administrative action as either final as to all the world or 
final only within the administration, i.e., as unreviewable orsubject to de novo review. 
Wyman, supra note 48, at 341. This is basically a distillation ofthe nineteenth-century 
view. Goodnow has a more complete discussion of forms of action, including officer suits, 
mandamus, certiorari, and other prerogative writs. The possibility of "special appeals, 
generally to the lower courts, from the decisions of administrative officers" is briefly 
mentioned on one page. Goodnow, supra note 48, at 441. Freund's early work is 
concerned with the scope of the power to regulate and the theory of regulation, and makes 
very little mention of judicial review. See Freund, The Police Power, supra note 48, at iii 
(noting treatise is organized by principle "that certain rights yield to the police power, 
while it respects and accommodates itself to others"). 
51. Ann Woolhandler has offered a "revisionist history" of nineteenth-century court- 
agency relationships, which includes the claim that his period featured instances of what I
call the appellate review model and she calls the "error" model. See Woolhandler, supra 
note 6, at 224-29 ("A 'pure' version of the error was not a common method of review of 
agency action in the nineteenth century, but a closely related method of review by 'appeal' 
was."). She admits that actual examples of appellate review of administrative action were 
rare, but argues that his was simply because Congress rarely provided by statute for judicial 
review of agency action. More tellingly, she admits that in those cases where courts were 
charged with reviewing a ency action under a writ of error or by appeal, "the review as 
generally de novo." Id. at 229. I am thus not persuaded by her claim that the error or 
appellate review model had any meaningful presence in nineteenth-century administrative 
law. 
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was dictated by the form of action under which review was sought. If the 
action was in mandamus, the court looked to see if the agent had violated 
a nondiscretionary legal duty. If the action was an original bill in equity, 
the court held a hearing and took evidence in a manner similar to what 
any court of equity would do. 
In all cases, at least in the federal courts, the court based its decision 
on the record produced in court. This might include the record gener- 
ated by the agency, but it could include supplemental evidence as well. 
Thus, all nineteenth-century review of agency action was, in effect, de 
novo. Consistent with the de novo nature of review, courts generally gave 
no deference to agency determinations, whether on issues of law or fact. 
Review was often narrow , as when the court applying the prerogative writs 
asked whether the agency was acting within its jurisdiction or whether an 
officer had violated a nondiscretionary legal duty. But whatever the per- 
mitted scope of review, there was no understanding of a sharing of au- 
thority or division of functions between court and agency. 
II. The Emergence of the Appellate Review Model 
The appellate review model first emerged in federal administrative 
law in decisions of the Supreme Court reviewing ICC rate and service 
orders in the period 1907-1910. Scholars of an earlier generation, most 
notably John Dickinson and Frederick Lee, observed an important shift 
in the Supreme Court's understanding of the appropriate review of ICC 
decisions at this time.52 Yet, it is worth examining this critical period in 
administrative law again, because it has largely been forgotten. One fac- 
tor that deserves closer attention is the relationship between doctrinal 
change and an upsurge in public dissatisfaction with aggressive judicial 
review of decisions of the ICC, culminating in the adoption of the 
Hepburn Act in 1906.53 In the course of a very few years immediately 
following the passage of the Hepburn Act, the Supreme Court jettisoned 
the nineteenth-century model of judicial review and stumbled onto the 
appellate review model. 
A. The ICC Crisis 
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the federal system of regu- 
lation of railroads centered on the ICC was widely perceived to be bro- 
ken, and the U.S. Supreme Court was widely identified as the culprit 
which had brought it down.54 As Stephen Skowronek has noted, "[b]y 
1896-97, the Court was openly declaring that it was not bound by the 
52. See Dickinson, supra note 14, at 160 (noting Court's approach was product of "a 
gradual process of evolution"); Lee, supra note 6, at 305 (tracing change to "a handful of 
decisions around the turn of the century"). 
53. Ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584. 
54. The best account of the political climate prior to the enactment of the Hepburn 
Act I have uncovered is Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The 
Expansion of Administrative Capacities 1877-1920, at 121-62, 248-84 (1982). For a more 
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conclusions of the commission, that it could admit additional evidence, 
and that it could set aside the commission's findings altogether."55 The 
Court's aggressive review threatened to reduce the ICC to the status of "a 
mere statistics-gathering agency."56 Yet by insisting that complainants 
had to begin before the Commission, the Court ensured that controver- 
sies were long, drawn-out affairs. The average case coming before the 
ICC took four years to final judgment, which "mocked the supposed 
economy and efficiency of the administrative remedy."57 
When the Supreme Court ruled in 1896 that the ICC lacked author- 
ity to prescribe maximum future rates,58 some type of congressional ac- 
tion was widely thought to be imperative. Numerous proposals to revise 
the Commission's authority circulated. But a deep conflict of interest be- 
tween shippers and railroads made reform difficult. The railroads, which 
were beginning to show signs of deterioration from underinvestment in 
new plant and equipment, wanted measures to legalize pooling and as- 
sure a rate structure that would allow them to raise new funds from inves- 
tors.59 They supported the establishment of a new specialized commerce 
court to expedite review proceedings and inject a larger element of ex- 
pertise into the review process. The railroads' political champions were 
the Old Guard Republicans of the industrial North.60 
Congressional representatives aligned with small shippers, especially 
in the West and South, viewed the regulatory issue as "a batde between 
the people and the corporations."61 They opposed railroad consolida- 
tion and rate relief, and "were enraged by any regulatory proposal that 
allowed the judiciary to check the will of the people's representatives."62 
As Skowronek writes: 
[D]uring the 1890s the judicial branch as a whole had become 
the archenemy of the forces of populism. The nullification of 
state regulatory laws in the 1890s and the nullification of the 
federal income tax law in 1895 identified the judiciary as the 
opponent of democracy upholding the plutocracy of eastern 
abbreviated account, see Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 
Stan. L. Rev. 1189, 1212-15 (1986) [hereinafter Rabin, Federal Regulation]. 
55. Skowronek, supra note 54, at 154-55. 
56. Id. at 151. 
57. Id. at 155. 
58. ICC v. Cincinnati, New Orleans 8c Tex. Pac. Ry. Co., 167 U.S. 479, 511 (1897). For 
the significance of this decision in the development of the understanding of when 
authority to make legislative rules has been delegated to agencies, see Thomas W. Merrill 
8c Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 
116 Harv. L. Rev. 467, 490-91, 581-82 (2002). 
59. See Albro Martin, Enterprise Denied: Origins of the Decline of American 
Railroads, 1897-1917, at 182-93 (1971) (detailing railroads' petitions for rate increases 
and Congress's legislative r sponse). 
60. See Skowronek, supra note 54, at 255 (stating Old Guard Republicans "would 
shield the railroads from broadside political attacks"). 
61. Id. at 253. 
62. Id. 
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capital. The representatives of the South and West were deter- 
mined to overthrow this judicial imperialism, and one way of 
doing so was to grant sweeping ratemaking powers to the ICC 
and radically restrict the scope of judicial review.63 
Standing between these factions was President Theodore Roosevelt, 
who had campaigned in 1904 on the need for regulatory reform. 
Roosevelt shared the progressive faith in administrative expertise, and to 
this end also sought to reign in judicial review.64 Consequently, 
Roosevelt was strongly opposed to one prominent reform proposal - cre- 
ating a specialized court to review ICC rate orders. 
B. The Hepburn Act 
Congressional consideration of reform began soon after Roosevelt's 
inauguration. The House quickly passed reform legislation, but it 
got nowhere in the more conservative Senate. The next year, 1906, 
Congressman William Hepburn submitted a new reform bill, drafted by 
the ICC and fully supported by the President.65 It easily passed the 
House with no amendments. The Old Guard Republicans in the Senate 
sought to embarrass the President by refusing to unite behind a commit- 
tee report, forcing the President to accept "Pitchfork" Ben Tillman, a 
Southern Democrat, as the floor leader for "his" bill. The matter pro- 
ceeded to the floor of the Senate, where a four-month debate on the ICC 
and the proper function of judicial review ensued.66 
The debate touched on many issues of far-reaching importance, such 
as the constitutionality of combining legislative, executive, and judicial 
functions in a single agency, whether Congress could delegate the power 
to regulate interstate commerce to a subordinate body, and whether the 
power to regulate commerce includes the power to prescribe rates for the 
future.67 As regards the issue of judicial review, the proposed legislation 
made one significant change in the original Interstate Commerce Act 
(ICA): Commission orders were to be self-executing thirty days after they 
became final, unless "suspended or set aside by a court of competent ju- 
risdiction."68 This change had widespread implications. The original Act 
had required that the Commission file a bill of equity in circuit court 
seeking judicial enforcement of its orders, causing the burden of inertia 
63. Id. 
64. See Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography 473-74 (1913) 
(offering example of Roosevelt's preference for executive rather than judicial action). 
65. Skowronek, supra note 54, at 256. 
66. Id. at 256-57. 
67. Each of these issues was raised in the opening speech of Senator Joseph Foraker, 
who argued that he Hepburn bill was unconstitutional i  each of these regards. 40 Cong. 
Rec. 3102-20 (1906). His comments elicited responses from many others, but it appears 
he stood virtually alone in condemning the Act outright on constitutional grounds. 
68. Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, § 4, 34 Stat. 584, 589 (1906) (amending Interstate 
Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 15, 24 Stat. 379, 384). 
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to work in favor of the railroads and against the Commission.69 Under 
the proposed legislation, the burden was reversed, and the railroad would 
have to persuade a court to enter a preliminary injunction against the 
Commission's order before it took effect.70 Interestingly, this sea change 
went largely uncontested, even in the Senate. Nearly everyone acqui- 
esced in the notion that the Commission's orders should be made self- 
executing. The question of whether giving a regulatory commission au- 
thority to issue such orders was consistent with Article Ill's conferral of 
the "judicial power" on federal courts was ignored. 
Nevertheless, the proposal to make Commission orders self-execut- 
ing explains why the question of the standard of judicial review was per- 
ceived to be of such importance by the "eloquent and circumlocutious 
lawyers in the Senate."71 Shifting the burden of going to court to the 
railroads would not be very consequential if courts would continue to 
review ICC orders de novo and under a standard of independent judg- 
ment. Shifting the burden to the railroads and narrowing the standard of 
review significantly would represent a fundamental change in the balance 
of power. Everyone understood there was going to be reform legislation, 
and, apparently, that the reform would include making the Commission's 
orders setting future maximum rates self-executing. But the question of 
the standard of review was the key to just how far-reaching the reform was 
going to be.72 
Modern historians such as Gabriel Kolko and Stephen Skowronek 
have failed to perceive the importance of making ICC orders self- 
executing, and thus have misunderstood what the debate in the Senate 
was about. Kolko dismisses the whole debate sis a sideshow.73 
Skowronek, for his part, mistakenly focuses on a provision of the 
Hepburn Act that authorized the Commission to seek a court order im- 
posing sanctions on a carrier for failing to obey an ICC order.74 This was 
69. Interstate Commerce Act § 16, 24 Stat, at 384-85. 
70. Hepburn Act § 5, 34 Stat, at 591; see Carl McFarland, Judicial Control of the 
Federal Trade Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission 1920-1930: A 
Comparative Study in the Relations of Courts to Administrative Commissions 115 (1933) 
("Thus the burden or initiative . . . was shifted from the commission tothe carrier."). 
71. Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and Regulation 1877-1916, at 133 (1965). 
72. See 40 Cong. Rec. 6690 (1906) (statement of Sen. Joseph Weldon Bailey) (noting 
"for three long months this controversy has been revolving around the question as to the 
character of a court review"); id. at 6687 (statement of Sen. Chester Long) (stating "this 
controversy has been as to the difference b tween a broad and a limited court review"). 
73. See Kolko, supra note 71, at 135 (suggesting "much of the drama nd excitement 
attributed tothe debate over the bill in the Senate . . . has been exaggerated"). 
74. With respect to such enforcement actions, the Hepburn Act provided that "[i]f, 
upon such hearing as the court may determine to be necessary , it appears that the order was 
regularly made and duly served . . . the court shall enforce obedience to such order." 
Hepburn Act § 5, 34 Stat, at 591 (emphasis added). Skowronek argues that he Old Guard 
Republicans and other proponents of vigorous judicial review could point to the clause 
authorizing the courts to decide what kind of judicial hearing was necessary. Skowronek, 
supra note 54, at 255-56. This left open the possibility that the courts would continue to 
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rarely mentioned in the Senate debate, and for good reason. The sena- 
tors understood that the main battle would take place when the carrier 
went to court to obtain a preliminary injunction against an ICC order 
before it went into effect.75 Once ICC orders became self-executing, 
what mattered was determining the proper standard of review for prelimi- 
nary injunctions, not the standard for deciding whether to penalize a rail- 
road for defying a lawful order that had already gone into effect.76 
The partisans in the Senate fell into two camps with respect to the 
standard for obtaining an injunction before an order took effect: those 
favoring "narrow" and those supporting "broad" review. Narrow review 
would have allowed the courts to engage in only as much review as neces- 
sary to save the Act from being declared unconstitutional. Drawing their 
cues from Supreme Court decisions on the constitutionality of state rate 
regulation, most notably the Minnesota Rate Case ,77 proponents of this 
view conceded that carriers had to be afforded an opportunity to present 
evidence and argument to a court that rates were set so low as to be con- 
fiscatory. But they would not have allowed any more review than the bare 
minimum needed to secure Supreme Court validation. The narrow re- 
view camp would have achieved this result by acknowledging that carriers 
could bring an action in federal court to enjoin a rate prescription order 
before it took effect, but by providing no statutory grounds upon which 
such a challenge could be based - and ideally by securing an amendment 
limiting challenges to constitutional claims only. 
insist on de novo review. The progressives and President Roosevelt, he suggests, could 
point to the clause requiring enforcement ofICC orders provided they were regularly 
made and duly served as suggesting a highly deferential mode of rule similar to the ultra 
vires model. Id. at 273. There is no evidence from the Senate debate that the respective 
factions invested any such significance in these phrases. 
75. See, e.g., 40 Cong. Rec. 6675 (1906) (statement of Sen. Augustus Bacon) (noting 
"grant of interlocutory or preliminary injunctions" is a "very grave and important manner" 
requiring "all possible safeguards, so that there shall be no hasty, no ill-advised, no 
improvident grant of an injunction"). 
76. The Hepburn Act imposed stiff penalties - $5,000 for each offense - for violating 
an order once it took effect. See Hepburn Act § 5, 34 Stat, at 591. Writing in 1931, Leo 
Sharfman oted that "[t]he penalties for disobedience of an order, which becomes 
operative from its effective date, are so severe, that the carriers do not await enforcement 
proceedings by the Commission, but themselves seek equitable relief, by initiating 
proceedings to enjoin, suspend, or invalidate the Commission's order." 2 I.L. Sharfman, 
The Interstate Commerce Commission: AStudy in Administrative Law and Procedure 388 
(1931). 
77. Chi., Milwaukee 8c St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890). Minnesota 
had established a commission to regulate intrastate railroad rates, and the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that its decisions were final and not subject to judicial review. The 
U.S. Supreme Court held that if rates were set so low as to deprive a carrier of the lawful 
use of its property, the failure to provide for any avenue of judicial review to redress this 
situation was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 
458. The decision clearly implied that federal legislation authorizing the ICC to set 
interstate rates without any possibility of judicial review would violate the Fifth 
Amendment. 
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The broad review camp, in contrast, wanted to confer general juris- 
diction on federal courts to enjoin rate orders before they took effect on 
any legal basis, including that the rate was set at an "unreasonably" low 
level. They would have secured this result by including an express provi- 
sion authorizing review by carriers by a bill in equity, and by providing 
that carriers could challenge rate orders as being unreasonably low. In 
effect, they wished to perpetuate the practice of allowing courts to reliti- 
gate rate controversies de novo. 
President Roosevelt had hoped to finesse the issue. The original 
Hepburn bill passed by the House contained provisions that presupposed 
the existence of judicial jurisdiction in equity, but did not expressly con- 
vey jurisdiction, or even provide a statutory cause of action to review ICC 
orders. As the debate heated up, and the contending groups sought 
amendments that would clarify the ambiguity, Roosevelt sent conflicting 
signals of support to one side and then the other.78 Taking note of these 
machinations, Senator Rayner argued that the difference could not be 
compromised, and in so doing he succinctly described the crux of 
dispute: 
The President tells us that these two reviews which he has sent in 
here are one and the same thing, but, Mr. President, they are as 
widely different as it is possible for two divergent propositions to 
be. The one is the review under the Constitution, which you 
can not eliminate without invalidating your law; the other is the 
broad statutory review, which permits the courts to try the cases 
de novo and in the same manner as if no such body as the 
Interstate Commerce Commission had ever existed upon the 
face of the earth.79 
The battle over the standard of judicial review raged in the Senate 
for nearly four months. In the end, all efforts to adopt clarifying amend- 
ments were defeated, including amendments expressly conferring juris- 
diction and amendments expressly limiting review to constitutional is- 
sues. The exhausted senators voted overwhelmingly to approve a bill 
that, like Congressman Hepburn's original bill, said nothing about the 
applicable standard of review.80 
For present purposes, one thing is particularly striking about the 
Senate debate. No senator advocated anything like the appellate review 
model as a basis for calibrating the proper degree of judicial review of 
ICC orders. Most of those who favored narrow review - populists like 
Ben Tillman and progressives like Robert LaFollette - probably would 
have preferred no judicial review at all. But to the extent that the 
78. See 40 Cong. Rec. 6685 (1906) (statement of Sen. Isidor Rayner) (describing 
Roosevelt's conflicting communications with senators). 
79. Id. at 6685-86. 
80. See Hepburn Act §4, 34 Stat, at 589 (providing that ICC orders "except orders for 
the payment of money" take effect in not less than thirty days unless the same shall be 
"suspended or set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction"). 
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Constitution required some review, they envisioned that such review 
would be de novo. Courts would take evidence and determine for them- 
selves whether rates had been set so low as to be confiscatory. Likewise, 
those who favored broad review, such as Nelson Aldrich, assumed that 
review would be de novo. After all, review would be by a bill of equity, 
which was understood to be an original action. 
From the perspective of the Supreme Court, the message encoded in 
the Hepburn Act was twofold. First, the public and the politicians were 
deeply unhappy with the Court's existing practices regarding judicial re- 
view of ICC rate orders.81 Second, Congress and the President had pro- 
vided no directions regarding what to do about it.82 The net effect was to 
delegate authority to the Court to decide on the new standard of review, 
with the implied threat that if the Court did not back off from its aggres- 
sive review practices, more drastic action would be in the offing. 
C. Strategic Retreat 
Shortly after the Hepburn Act was passed, the tenor of Supreme 
Court decisions in ICC matters changed dramatically.83 I will not provide 
a comprehensive review of the decisions, but will only present the high- 
lights in what amounts to a rapid progression toward a new understand- 
ing of the judicial role. 
Within a year of the signing of the Act, the Court rendered its 
landmark decision in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.84 
The case did not concern the standard of review in an action to enjoin an 
ICC rate order. The question, rather, was whether the Interstate 
81. See 40 Cong. Rec. 5722 (1906) (statement of Sen. Robert La Follette) ("[T]he 
public refuses longer to recognize this subject as one which the railroads alone have the 
right to pass upon. . . . Because it is a natural monopoly, because it is the creature of 
government, it becomes the duty of government to see to it that the railway company 
inflicts no wrong upon the public . . . ."). 
82. See 40 Cong. Rec. 6778 (1906) (statement of Sen. Jonathan P. Dolliver) 
("[N]obody knows exacdy what he courts of the United States will do with an order of the 
Commission .... [A] side from providing the venue of the suits and distinctly providing 
that he orders of the Commission may be set aside or suspended by a court of competent 
jurisdiction, we said nothing."). 
83. All observers who had lived through the change concur in this assessment. See, 
e.g., Dickinson, supra note 14, at 160 ("It was the Hepburn Act of 1906 which finally 
turned the scale."); McFarland, supra note 70, at 120 ("[T]he record of relations between 
the commission a d the courts after 1906 is altogether different from that of the previous 
period."); Lee, supra note 6, at 305 ("[B]y a handful of decisions around the turn of the 
century arising under long since repealed provisions of the original Interstate Commerce 
Act, the Supreme Court arrived at the rudiments ofthe legal principles that still govern in 
statutory review proceedings the relationship of the courts to administrative action . . . ."). 
Modern histories concur as well. See, e.g., James W. Ely, Jr., Railroads and American Law 
228 (2001) ("During the early decades of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court in the 
main bolstered the ICC's authority and largely retreated from review of railroad rates."); 
Rabin, Federal Regulation, supra note 54, at 1234 (discussing Court's adoption of "new 
approach"). 
84. 204 U.S. 426 (1907). 
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Commerce Act preempted lawsuits grounded in the common law duty of 
common carriers to charge only reasonable rates. Stressing the congres- 
sional objectives of assuring uniformity of rates and rooting out discrimi- 
nation, the Court held that the Act preempted common law actions. The 
Court emphasized that the Act gave the power to determine the reasona- 
bleness of rates in interstate commerce to the Commission, not to the 
courts.85 If the power of hearing original complaints rested in both the 
Commission and the courts, "a conflict would arise which would render 
the enforcement of the act impossible."86 The implications of this for the 
standard of review, although not noted in the opinion, were far-reaching. 
If courts could not entertain original complaints charging unreasonable- 
ness, it would seem to follow that they could not substitute their judg- 
ment for that of the Commission on judicial review either. The Court 
would soon note those implications explicitly.87 
The occasion was a decision this Article will refer to as Illinois Central 
I.88 The case arose under the original Interstate Commerce Act, so it did 
not directly implicate the Hepburn Act. Counsel for the railroad, seeking 
to overturn an ICC rate order, made an elaborate presentation asking the 
Court to adopt a series of "rules or principles" indicating circumstances 
in which railroad rates would be deemed reasonable.89 Considering each 
of the proposed rules or principles in turn, the Court, speaking through 
Justice McKennna, held that each fell 
" 
'peculiarly within the province of 
the Commission,'" not the courts.90 Distinguishing the various prece- 
dents cited by counsel, the Court noted that in each there had been "a 
single, distinct, and dominant proposition of law which the Commission 
had rejected, and the exact influence of which, in its decisions, could be 
estimated."91 In the present case, in contrast: 
The question submitted to the Commission, as we have said, 
with tiresome repetition perhaps, was one which turned on mat- 
ters of fact. In that question, of course, there were elements of 
law, but we cannot see that any one of these or any circum- 
stances probative of the conclusion was overlooked or disre- 
garded. The testimony was voluminous. It is not denied that it 
was conflicting and, by concession of counsel, it included a large 
amount of testimony taken on behalf of appellants in support of 
the propositions contended for by them. Whether the 
Commission gave too much weight to some parts of it and too 
85. Id. at 441, 448. 
86. Id. at 441. 
87. See 111. Cent. R.R. Co. v. ICC ( Illinois Centrall), 206 U.S. 441, 464 (1907) (rejecting 
request to create judicial presumptions about rates and noting redress for 
unreasonableness must be through ICC (citing Abilene Cotton Oil Co ., 204 U.S. 426)). 
88. Illinois Central /,206 U.S. 441. 
89. Id. at 454. 
90. Id. at 456 (quoting Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 184, 
194 (1896)). 
91. Id. at 457 (emphasis added). 
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little weight to other parts of it is a question of fact and not of 
law.92 
There was no question that the Court was in retreat, and that it did 
so by emphasizing the law-fact distinction familiar to judges from the con- 
ventions associated with judicial review of jury verdicts. In another case 
decided at this time, the Court said the Commission should be reversed 
only because of "clear and unmistakable error,"93 invoking the language 
used to review factual determinations of judges sitting without a jury.94 
Three years later, the Court decided another case by the same name 
but presenting different issues, which this Article will refer to as Illinois 
Central 7/.95 The case involved the impact of the Hepburn Act on the 
Commission's authority to allocate rail cars in periods of car shortages. 
The Court pointedly noted that the new Act made ICC orders 
self-executing, observing that in this and other respects the new law en- 
dowed the Commission "with large administrative functions."96 The 
Court then described its review power as embracing (1) "all relevant ques- 
tions of constitutional power or right," (2) "all pertinent questions as to 
whether the administrative order is within the scope of the delegated au- 
thority," and (3) whether the exercise of authority "has been manifested 
in such an unreasonable manner as to cause it" to exceed the scope of 
delegated authority.97 These review functions, the Court remarked, "are 
of the essence of judicial authority,"98 and may not be curtailed by Con- 
gress. But the Court immediately said it was "equally plain" that it could 
not, "under the guise of exerting judicial power, usurp merely administra- 
tive functions by setting aside a lawful administrative order upon our con- 
ception as to whether the administrative order has been wisely exer- 
cised."99 Here we see a clear articulation of a division of functions 
between court and agency based on relative competencies. Illinois Central 
II quickly became the leading precedent on the standard of review of ICC 
rate orders.100 
Two years later, in ICC v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. , the Court, in an 
opinion by Justice Lamar, spelled out in greater detail the standard of 
review that would apply when a carrier alleged that the Commission's 
92. Id. at 466. 
93. Cincinnati Ry. Co. v. ICC, 206 U.S. 142, 154 (1907). 
94. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) (findings of fact in case tried without a jury 
"must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous"); Stern, supra note 4, at 79-80 
("[FJindings [of trial courts] were to be accepted unless clearly erroneous."). 
95. ICC v. 111. Cent. R.R. Co. ( Illinois Central II), 215 U.S. 452 (1910). 




100. See William Z. Ripley, Railroads: Rates and Regulation 538-45 (1927) 
(describing Illinois Central II as "[t]he leading Supreme Court decision construing the 
Hepburn law" and collecting follow-on decisions). 
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application of law to fact was so defective as to amount to reversible er- 
ror.101 Such "mixed questions of law and fact," the Court said, are 
subject to review, but when supported by evidence [are] ac- 
cepted as final. Not that its decision, involving as it does so 
many and such vast public interests, can be supported by a mere 
scintilla of proof - but the courts will not examine the facts fur- 
ther than to determine whether there was substantial evidence 
to sustain the order.102 
Here we witness the birth of the famous "substantial evidence" stan- 
dard of review of agency findings of fact.103 The standard was bor- 
rowed - without citation of authority - from the established understand- 
ing of the standard of review that an appeals court applies in reviewing a 
jury verdict.104 
That same year, the Court upheld a version of the appellate review 
model against a due process claim.105 The State of Washington adopted 
by statute virtually the same scheme for review of orders of its railroad 
commission that the Hepburn Act had adopted for review of ICC orders. 
The commission's orders were self-executing unless enjoined before they 
went into effect. Unlike the Hepburn Act, however, the Washington stat- 
ute specified that judicial review was to be based on the record produced 
before the commission.106 The railroad claimed that this denial of any 
right to make a new record in the reviewing court denied it due process. 
The Court, speaking again through Justice Lamar, rejected the claim, 
analogizing the role of the commission to a master in chancery, who 
makes a record and recommends conclusions of law, which are then re- 
viewed by the chancellor.107 The Court noted that the Washington law 
went further than the ICA cases, where in theory the record could be 
made de novo. But it observed that recent decisions had disapproved of 
the practice of allowing carriers to supplement the record on review, so 
Washington had merely "enlarg[ed]" on the practice the Court had ap- 
proved in federal proceedings.108 
It would be misleading to suggest that all decisions after the 
Hepburn Act deferred to the policy judgments of the ICC, just as it would 
be an exaggeration to say that all review before the Hepburn Act applied 
pure independent judgment. The Court, perhaps inevitably, engaged in 
101. 222 U.S. 541 (1912). 
102. Id. at 546-48. 
103. See E. Blythe Stason, "Substantial Evidence" in Administrative Law, 89 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1026, 1040-41 (1941) (identifying Union Pacific as first judicial opinion to use 
"substantial evidence" in administrative lawcontext). 
104. See Stern, supra note 4, at 73 (identifying substantial evidence as being "well- 
established" standard for review of jury verdicts) . 
105. Washington ex rel. Or. R.R. 8c Navigation Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U.S. 510 (1912). 
106. Id. at 515. 
107. Id. at 527. 
108. Id. 
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some backsliding.109 Yet within a decade, whether rates were discrimina- 
tory or unjust and unreasonable were routinely said to be "questions of 
fact that have been confided by Congress to the judgment and discretion 
of the Commission."110 Accordingly, the Commission's resolution of 
these matters was "not to be disturbed by the courts except upon a show- 
ing that they are unsupported by evidence, were made without a hearing, 
exceed constitutional limits, or for some other reason amount to an 
abuse of power."111 Of particular significance, the Court strenuously lec- 
tured lower courts that they were to decide injunction proceedings based 
on the record made before the Commission if at all possible. Although 
no language in the statute compelled such a practice, the Court expressly 
invoked the Hepburn Act as making it especially "appropriate" that "all 
pertinent objections to action proposed by the Commission and the evi- 
dence to sustain them shall first be submitted to that body."112 
As Skowronek has observed, the Supreme Court appears to have "un- 
derstood the volatile political nature of the question at hand and the 
growing precariousness of its own political position."113 The Court ac- 
cordingly had embarked on a quest "for a new and more secure position 
before the growing democratic attack on the judiciary got out of hand 
and caused some real damage to its prerogatives and its prestige."114 
More precisely, what seems to have happened is that the Court, facing a 
political crisis to its own authority, looked into the doctrinal tool bag for 
something that would permit it to back off without losing face. The con- 
ventions governing appellate review of trial court decisions seemed to fit, 
at least in the sense that they satisfied the immediate imperative for a 
strategic retreat. 
D. The Source of the Appellate Review Model 
So far, I have explained the timing of the adoption of the appellate 
review model and the motivations that led the Supreme Court to em- 
brace that model. What is missing is an explanation of where exacdy the 
model came from. This, I must confess, remains something of a mystery. 
Two sources can be ruled out. Congress did not direct the courts to 
adopt the appellate review model in the Hepburn Act. The Act said noth- 
109. See, e.g., ICC v. Chi. Great W. Ry. Co., 209 U.S. 108, 123 (1908) (affirming 
reversal of ICC by circuit court on undue preference laim) ; Penn Ref. Co. v. W. N.Y. & Pa. 
R.R. Co., 208 U.S. 208, 221 (1908) (reversing determination f rate discrimination by ICC 
concurred in by jury empanelled by circuit court). 
110. Mfrs. Ry. Co. v. United States, 246 U.S. 457, 481 (1918). 
111. Id. The Court had previously held that a post-Hepburn Act ICC order supported 
by no evidence should be reversed ascontrary to law. See Fla. E. Coast Ry. v. United States, 
234 U.S. 167, 185 (1914) ("[W]here it is contended that an order whose enforcement is 
resisted was rendered without any evidence whatever to support it, the consideration f
such a question involves not an issue of fact, but one of law . . . ."). 
112. Mfrs Ry ., 246 U.S. at 490 (citations omitted). 
113. Skowronek, supra note 54, at 260. 
114. Id. 
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ing about the standard of review in injunction proceedings. And it car- 
ried forward the language of the original ICA for reparations cases, which 
had been interpreted as requiring de novo review.115 Nor did any aca- 
demic propose the appellate review model during the relevant time 
frame. The handful of scholars who addressed the law of administration 
at this time had their thinking tightly locked in the bipolar model of the 
nineteenth century.116 
Clearly, the immediate source of the appellate review model was the 
Court itself. No single Justice played a critical role in developing the ap- 
pellate review model. Justice White authored the two most important de- 
cisions that acknowledged the policymaking role of the ICC - Abilene 
Cotton Oil 117 and Illinois Central II118 But Justice Lamar's opinions drew 
most explicidy on the example and the linguistic conventions of civil liti- 
gation, analogizing a regulatory commission to a master in chancery and 
introducing the phrase "substantial evidence" into administrative law.119 
No Justice made an explicit connection between the court-agency rela- 
tionship and the judge-jury or appeals court-trial court relationships.120 
The conventions developed in the one context were transposed to the 
other through a collective process of trial and error, albeit over a rela- 
tively brief period of time. 
The rigidly bipolar nature of judicial review began to break down 
toward the end of the nineteenth century. Professor Mashaw has noted 
that exceptions began to be recognized to the "conclusiveness" of deci- 
sions by the Lands Office.121 Similarly, the narrow ultra vires review avail- 
able under mandamus and habeas corpus began to widen.122 Professor 
115. See supra Part II. B. 
116. See supra text accompanying otes 47-50. 
117. Tex. 8c Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 430 (1907). 
118. ICC v. 111. Cent. R.R. Co., 215 U.S. 452, 459 (1892). 
119. Washington ex rel. Or. R.R. 8c Navigation Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U.S. 510, 527 
(1912) (discussing chancery analogy); ICC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 222 U.S. 541, 548 
(1912) (introducing "substantial evidence" standard). 
120. Dickinson cites two state court decisions that expressly analogized workmen's 
compensation commissions tojuries for purposes of review. See Dickinson, supra note 14, 
at 154 n.81 (citing In re Savage, 110 N.E. 283 (Mass. 1915) and Papinaw v. Grand Trunk 
Ry. Co., 155 N.W. 545 (Mich. 1915)). Note, however, that both these decisions came after 
the Supreme Court had effectively adopted the analogy for purposes of review of ICC 
orders. 
121. Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration andAdministrative Law in the Guilded 
Age, 119 Yale L.J. 1362, 1408-11 (2010) [hereinafter Mashaw, Federal Administration] . 
122. On habeas corpus, compare Paul Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal 
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76Harv. L. Rev. 441, 478-83 (1963) (arguing that until 
twentieth century, habeas corpus review as limited to examining whether custodian was 
acting within his jurisdiction), with James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The 
Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1997, 
2045, 2055 (1992) (contending courts began to use habeas to review for error in limited 
class of nationally important claims in nineteenth century). On mandamus, ee Mashaw, 
Federal Administration, supra note 121, at 1405-07 (citing examples of expansion of 
mandamus review). 
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Woolhandler has insightfully pointed out that appeals courts began using 
the deferential "clearly erroneous" standard of review for findings of fact 
by judges sitting as chancellors in equity, in parallel with the use of this 
standard in appeals from decisions by judges sitting without juries in cases 
at law.123 So, we can surmise that appeals courts (such as the U.S. 
Supreme Court) would increasingly find it anomalous to engage in de 
novo review in any case based on equity jurisdiction, including a case re- 
viewing agency action. 
But none of these developments entailed the adoption of the appel- 
late review model for calibrating the posture of a reviewing court toward 
the decisions of an administrative agency.124 The old order was breaking 
down, but the new era was not yet born. Nevertheless, the spark did jump 
between 1907 and 1910, and the appellate review model of administrative 
law was launched. 
III. Entrenchment of the Appellate Review Model 
If the Hepburn Act provided the catalytic event that brought the ap- 
pellate review model into being, subsequent events quickly reinforced the 
Court's gravitation toward this conception of judicial review. By 1930, 
well before Franklin Roosevelt was elected President, the appellate review 
model was thoroughly entrenched.125 
A. The Commerce Court 
One episode that occurred shortly after the adoption of the 
Hepburn Act undoubtedly helped secure the status of the appellate re- 
view model in the context of review of ICC rate orders: the rise and rapid 
demise of the so-called Commerce Court between 1910 and 1913. The 
Commerce Court was a specialized Article III tribunal devoted exclusively 
to review of ICC decisions. Supporters argued that such a court, staffed 
by judges who devoted their energies exclusively to railroad matters, 
would "prevent delay incident to the adjudication and prosecution of 
cases," "overcome the apparent inability of the Federal Judges to ade- 
quately meet the technical and conflicting evidence submitted," and end 
"the dissimilarity and contrariety of opinions issuing from different 
123. Woolhandler, supra note 6, at 226-29. 
124. In United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 582 (1899), the Court upheld the use of 
an "appeal" to review decisions of the Patent Office. See also infra notes 256-259 and 
accompanying text (discussing Duell). But the decision, which was soon forgotten, 
contained no guidance about how the "appellate" function would be exercised in the 
context of reviewing an administrative body. 
125. A particularly striking decision is Tagg Bros. 8c Moorhead v. United States, 280 
U.S. 420 (1930), where Justice Brandeis reviewed the ICC cases, found that they 
conclusively established the appellate review model, and then extended this understanding 
to define the judicial role in reviewing decisions under the Packers and Stockyards Act. Id. 
at 443-45. 
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Federal Courts."126 The creation of such a court was much discussed dur- 
ing the debate that led to the adoption of the Hepburn Act, and it was 
omitted from the final bill only because of President Roosevelt's adamant 
opposition. 
The idea of a specialized court did not die, however, and when a 
further round of reforms strengthening the powers of the ICC was con- 
sidered in 1910, President Taft threw his support behind the idea of the 
Commerce Court, leading to its creation in the Mann-Elkins Act adopted 
in that year.127 Although the Commerce Court "experiment" was to last 
only three years, it had several points of significance for the development 
of the appellate review model. 
In adopting the Mann-Elkins Act, Congress arguably ratified - or at 
least signaled its strong approval of - the Supreme Court's newly deferen- 
tial stance toward review of decisions of the ICC. In hearings conducted 
by the Senate Commerce Committee to consider the proposal to create a 
commerce court, several witnesses warmly praised the Court's recent de- 
cisions, especially Illinois Central 7/.128 One witness - Martin A. Knapp, 
who was Chairman of the ICC and soon to be named chief judge of the 
Commerce Court - proposed that Congress adopt an amendment stating 
that nothing in the new Act would give the Commerce Court "any juris- 
diction or authority not now possessed by the circuit courts."129 This was 
designed to lock in the post-Hepburn Act conception of judicial authority 
recently adopted by the Supreme Court. Congress readily agreed, and 
added a provision to this effect to the legislation.130 Knowledgeable ob- 
servers, including Justices of the Supreme Court, could not help but note 
that Congress was pleased with the new appellate review model. 
Shortly after Woodrow Wilson was inaugurated as President in 1913, 
the Commerce Court was unceremoniously abolished. The court had 
many failings, including perhaps that Congress concluded it did not want 
controversial railroad rate matters setded by a tribunal insulated from its 
control.131 But among the many sources of dissatisfaction with the court, 
one, not unexpectedly, was that it engaged in very aggressive review of 
126. J. Newton Baker, The Commerce Court - Its Origin, Its Powers and Its Judges, 20 
Yale L.J. 555, 555 (1911). 
127. Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539. 
128. See Court of Commerce, Railroad Rates, Etc.: Hearing on S. 3376 and S. 5106 
Before the S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 61st Cong. 34-35 (1910) (statement of 
Rush C. Butler, representing Chicago Association of Commerce and National Industrial 
Traffic League); id. at 200-03 (testimony of Martin A. Knapp); id. at 211-12 (testimony of 
Judson C. Clements). 
129. Id. at 201 (testimony of Martin A. Knapp). 
130. Mann-Elkins Act, 36 Stat, at 539 ("Nothing contained in this Act shall be 
construed asenlarging the jurisdiction now possessed by the circuit [ ] courts of the United 
States or the judges thereof, that is hereby transferred to and vested in the commerce 
court."). 
131. See George E. Dix, The Death of the Commerce Court: A Study in Institutional 
Weakness, 8 Am. J. Legal Hist. 238, 253-57 (1964) (advancing this thesis). 
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ICC decisions. Martin Knapp, after he was named chief judge of the 
court, took the position that review would be on the record generated by 
the Commission, but under a standard of independent judgment.132 
Progressives and shipper constituencies were outraged. As one commen- 
tator put it, "this body of usurping judges upset the rulings of the com- 
mission in practically every important case . . . and this not on questions 
of law but purely on findings of fact."133 
The Supreme Court, for its part, seemed to view the upstart tribunal 
as a rival. It overturned four of the first five Commerce Court decisions 
that came before it for review,134 and narrowly interpreted the scope of 
its jurisdiction. Democrats and progressive Republicans seized on the 
Supreme Court's sharp language condemning the Commerce Court for 
overreaching as confirmation of the court's pro-railroad bias. When im- 
peachment proceedings commenced against one of the five judges for 
using his office to promote his private interests in railroads, the court's 
fate was sealed. 
The sudden collapse of the Commerce Court served to further en- 
trench the appellate review model. The Supreme Court likely saw the 
fate of the Commerce Court as a vindication of its strategy of accommo- 
dation between reviewing courts and agencies. The failure of the special- 
ized court left the appellate review model as the only option on the table 
for reaching some solution midway between the "bipolar" options of the 
nineteenth century. Furthermore, complaints about the Commerce 
Court's aggressive review, and Congress's eagerness to end the experi- 
ment, no doubt reinforced the political message that some kind of judi- 
cial retreat from de novo review was imperative. The appellate review 
model offered a way for the Court to retreat with dignity. 
B. Post-Commerce Court Decisions 
By 1918, the Court's post-Commerce Court Act decisions had effec- 
tively congealed into the appellate review formula familiar to modern ad- 
ministrative lawyers. All judicial review of ICC orders, including those in 
which a claim of confiscation was advanced, was based solely on the re- 
132. See Frank H. Dixon, Railroads and Government: Their Relations in the United 
States, 1910-1921, at 45-51 (1922) ("The Commerce Court assumed jurisdiction, and 
while its conclusion was identical with that of the Commission, it is evident hat it could 
have reached no conclusion at all without reviewing the facts and substituting its own 
judgment upon them for that of the Commission."). 
133. Dix, supra note 131, at 257 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting C. 
Synder, Justice vs. Technicality, Courts in Reform, Colliers, Feb. 24, 1912, at 28). 
134. Skowronek, supra note 54, at 266. For the overall record of the Commerce 
Court, see Felix Frankfurter 8c James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court: A 
Study in the Federal Judicial System 165 n.95 (1928) ("94 cases were docketed in the 
Commerce Court. 43 decisions were rendered, including one rehearing. Appeals were 
taken in 22 cases, of which 13 were reversed, 2 modified, and 7 affirmed."). 
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cord before the Commission.135 Questions of fact, and mixed questions 
of law and fact, were for the Commission to decide, subject to review 
under the substantial evidence standard. The Court would decide inde- 
pendently only questions of constitutional right, whether the agency was 
acting within its jurisdiction, and pure questions of law. 
The judicial attitude also changed significantly in reparations cases. 
With respect to reparations claims, the Hepburn Act eliminated the ap- 
proach to judicial review under the original ICA - a petition in equity to 
enforce the Commission's order - and provided instead that if a carrier 
did not comply with a reparations order, a shipper could file an action in 
circuit court, where "[s]uch suit shall proceed in all respects like other 
civil suits for damages."136 The Act nevertheless carried forward the pro- 
vision of the original ICA that in such an action "the findings and order 
of the Commission shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein 
stated."137 Because the Act specifically directed courts to proceed "in all 
respects" like they were adjudicating a civil suit for damages, it is not sur- 
prising that courts exercised more independent judgment in reparations 
cases than they did in rate prescription cases.138 Even so, it was clear to 
contemporary observers that "the courts have given more weight to the 
findings of the commission, even in reparations cases, than they did 
shortly after the commission was established."139 
135. The dictum in Manufacturers Railway was reaffirmed in the context of a 
confiscation claim in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 53-54 
(1936); see supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text (discussing Manufacturers 
Railway) . 
136. Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, § 5, 36 Stat. 584, 591 (1906). 
137. Id. 
138. Thus, in Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 236 U.S. 412 (1915), the Court 
rejected the contention that the prima facie evidence provision violated ue process and 
deprived the carrier of its right to trial by jury, observing that " [t]his provision only 
establishes a rebuttable presumption. It cuts off no defense, interposes no obstacle to a 
full contestation fthe issues, and takes no question of fact from either court or jury." Id. 
at 430. Modern proponents of the Article III public rights theory have placed great 
emphasis on the Hepburn Act's divergent treatment of reparations cases and rate 
prescription cases, suggesting that Congress perceived an action to require the payment of 
reparations to be a "private right" - which required a judicial action in which the findings 
of the Commission were regarded as only prima facie evidence - whereas the prescription 
of rates for the future was a "public right," and hence something the Commission could 
direct in a self-enforcing order. See Nelson, supra note 21, at 598 8c n.150 (noting 
"authoritative resolution . . . required an exercise of 'judicial' power, because it implicated 
property rights that had already vested in the regulated entities"); Young, supra note 33, at 
813-19 (providing background on Hepburn amendments oInterstate Commerce Act). 
As discussed below, the support for this claim is weak. See infra notes 218-235. 
139. A.M. Tollefson, Judicial Review of the Decisions of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (pt. 2), 11 Minn. L. Rev. 504, 505-06 (1927); accord Gregory Hankin, 
Conclusiveness ofthe Federal Trade Commission's Findings as to Facts, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 
233, 240 (1924) (reviewing ICC cases and concluding "the findings of fact in the 
reparation cases had greater weight in the courts than was previously attributed tothem"). 
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Particularly important here was the development of the distinction 
between "evidential" and "ultimate" facts.140 The Commission's order 
was given only prima facie effect with respect to ultimate facts such as 
"whether there has been injury, and if so to what extent."141 But ques- 
tions preliminary to these and which are "administrative in character, 
such as reasonableness of rates, are evidential facts and such findings, 
with some exceptions . . . chiefly as to questions of law, are conclusive and 
will not be reviewed by the courts even where such questions arise in 
reparations cases."142 Soon, the Court would say that the Commission 
enjoys 
a large degree of latitude in the investigation of claims for repa- 
ration, and the resulting findings and order of the Commission 
may not be rejected as evidence because of any errors in its pro- 
cedure not amounting to a denial of the right to a fair hearing, 
so long as the essential facts found are based upon substantial 
evidence.143 
Whatever distance remained between judicial review of reparations 
and rate prescription orders, both were comfortably within the orbit of 
the appellate review model. 
C. The ETC 
The early history of judicial review of decisions of the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) is also instructive, because it shows how the appellate 
review model quickly spread beyond the context of ICC review proceed- 
ings and how it could easily be adapted for offensive as well as defensive 
purposes. The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 was a patchwork 
of discordant ideas,144 and what quickly became the most frequently in- 
voked provision of the Act, section 5, was hastily cobbled together at the 
last minute with little opportunity for legislative discussion.145 As en- 
acted, section 5 sweepingly authorized the Commission to bring proceed- 
ings to determine whether particular firms were engaged in "[u]nfair 
methods of competition" in interstate commerce.146 An affirmative find- 
ing would result in a cease and desist order, which could be enforced 
through an action by the Commission for an injunction in federal court; 
alternatively, a party against whom the order was directed could bring an 
action to have the order set aside. In either type of proceeding, the Act 
140. See Meeker, 236 U.S. at 427 (defining "ultimate" facts). 
141. Tollefson, supra note 139, at 509. 
142. Id. 
143. Spiller v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 253 U.S. 117, 126 (1920). 
144. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006)). 
145. See Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation: Charles Francis Adams, Louis 
D. Brandeis, James M. Landis, Alfred E. Kahn 112-28 (1984) (discussing origins of the 
Federal Trade Commission). 
146. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 38 Stat, at 719 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45(a)(1)). 
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provided that "the findings of the Commission as to the facts, if sup- 
ported by testimony, shall be conclusive."147 The legislative history indi- 
cates this formulation was chosen in order to adopt the deferential stan- 
dard of review the Supreme Court had developed in its post-Hepburn Act 
ICC decisions.148 Nothing was said in the statute about the standard of 
review of questions of law, or of ultimate facts, i.e., the application of law 
to facts in making a determination of whether a business practice was an 
"unfair method of competition." 
In its first confrontation with the new Act, FTC v. Gratz , the Supreme 
Court wasted no time making clear that it had sole and final authority to 
determine what practices could be described as "unfair methods of com- 
petition."149 This, the Court said, was a question of law, and thus for the 
courts, not the Commission, to determine.150 The court of appeals had 
set aside the Commission's order on the ground that the Commission 
had produced no evidence that the conduct the Commission thought un- 
fair - tying the purchase of cotton bale ties to the purchase of bagging 
cloth - was the general practice of the respondent.151 Realizing, perhaps, 
that this was hard to square with the deferential standard of review of 
facts prescribed by the statute, the Court shifted the ground of decision 
to the legal definition of "unfair methods of competition." The Court 
then concluded, as a matter of law, that the respondents' tie-in scheme 
was not unfair.152 
Gratz set the pattern for judicial review of FTC cease and desist or- 
ders for the next twenty years. The Supreme Court repeatedly reversed 
the Commission but never on the ground that facts of record failed to 
support the Commission's conclusion that a method of competition was 
unfair. Instead, the Court freely indulged in defining the scope of "un- 
fair competition" itself, sometimes with reference to parallel judgments 
147. Id. at 720 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(c)). In 1938 the word "testimony" was 
changed to "evidence." Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 1107, 52 Stat. 973, 1028. 
There is no indication any change in meaning was intended. 
148. As was true when the Mann-Elkins Act was adopted in 1910, the Court's 
decisions, in this instance Illinois Central II and Union Pacific, were frequently cited with 
approval. See Stason, supra note 103, at 1042-44 (discussing legislative history of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act's judicial review provision). Senator Cummins, who 
proposed the language ventually adopted, discussed the Union Pacific case and said, "This 
probably is the clearest and most satisfactory expression of the law that can be found, and 
in my amendment I am endeavoring to make this law applicable to the orders of the 
proposed trade commission." 51 Cong. Rec. 13,045 (1914). Early decisions of the courts 
of appeals reviewing factual challenges to FTC orders under this provision likewise 
generally construed itin accordance with the substantial evidence standard developed in 
the ICC context. See Hankin, supra note 139, at 245-71 (discussing courts' treatment of
finding of facts made by FTC). 
149. 253 U.S. 421 (1920), overruled in part by FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 
(1966). 
150. Id. at 427. 
151. Id. at 424-25. 
152. Id. at 428-29. 
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reached by courts under the antitrust laws,153 and sometimes based on 
nothing more than its own intuitions.154 The meaning and application of 
unfair competition, the Court intoned, "must be arrived at by what this 
Court elsewhere has called 'the gradual process of judicial inclusion and 
exclusion.'"155 The Court also seized on the statutory language authoriz- 
ing courts to "modify" the Commission's order on review to significantly 
recast the Commission's remedial orders.156 
In one case, in a passage that was probably dicta, the Court opined 
that it had the authority to "examine the whole record" to ascertain 
whether there were "material facts not reported by the Commission" that 
might support a different outcome. However, even here it acknowledged 
that the ordinary course in such a case would be to remand to the 
Commission, "the primary fact-finding body," to make additional find- 
ings.157 This elicited a rebuke from Chief Justice Taft, who said he hoped 
the majority did not mean that "the court has discretion to sum up the 
evidence pro and con on issues undecided by the Commission and make 
itself the fact-finding body."158 He reminded his colleagues that "we 
should scrupulously comply with the evident intention of Congress that 
the Federal Commission be made the fact-finding body and that the 
Court should in its rulings preserve the Board's character as such."159 
Chief Justice Taft's lecture was taken to heart. Never again during 
this formative period did the Court suggest that courts should engage in 
any meaningful review of the FTC's findings of fact. There was no need 
to. With an extraordinarily vague statute, and the understanding that the 
courts had complete authority to interpret that statute as they saw fit, the 
federal judges could reverse the Commission any time they encountered 
an outcome they did not like. 
153. See, e.g., FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 452-54 (1922) (assessing 
resale price policy against judicial precedents regarding resale price maintenance under 
Sherman Act). 
154. See, e.g., FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 651-53 (1931) (deciding false 
advertising of preparation as an "obesity cure" is not a method of competition); FTC v. 
Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565, 574 (1924) (holding wholesaler's refusal to deal 
with manufacturer who sells to competing wholesaler not unfair); FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 
261 U.S. 463, 476 (1923) (holding practice of renting underground tanks to retailers at 
nominal rents in return for exclusive dealing agreement not unfair); FTC v. Curtis Publ'g 
Co., 260 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1923) (holding contract prohibiting dealers from selling 
competitor's publications not unfair); see also FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 27-30 (1929) 
(refusing to enforce FTC order applicable to squabbling retailers in District of Columbia 
because it did not implicate "the interest of the public"); cf. FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 
258 U.S. 483, 492-94 (1922) (holding practice of selling underwear made of only part wool 
as "natural merino" or "natural wool" unfair). 
155. Raladam , 283 U.S. at 648 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
156. See, e.g., Curtis Publ'g Co., 260 U.S. at 580 ("[T]he statute grants jurisdiction [to 
the court] to make and enter ... a decree affirming, modifying, or setting aside an order 
[from the FTC] "). 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 583 (Taft, C.J., doubting). 
159. Id. 
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The FTC was regarded by the courts during this era with something 
approaching contempt.160 It suffered from weak appointments, insuffi- 
cient appropriations from Congress, hostility from the organized bar, 
and, above all, a legal mandate so vague as to be meaningless.161 What is 
clear is that the appellate review model was quickly and readily adapted to 
the end of supervising an upstart agency. A model that originated in the 
need for strategic retreat from oversight of the ICC was quickly turned 
around and used as an instrument of aggression against the poor FTC. 
IV. The Apostle of the Appellate Review Model 
In administrative law, and perhaps public law more generally, aca- 
demic writing is rarely the catalyst for fundamental legal change. When 
the law takes a detour, the impetus tends to come from the courts them- 
selves, and the Supreme Court in particular. Innovation is not always - or 
perhaps even usually - self-consciously chosen by judges for instrumental 
reasons. It may simply be a mutation produced by the pressures of litiga- 
tion, which is then seized upon as something that "works" better than 
what came before. The Chevron doctrine, the hard look doctrine, mod- 
ern standing doctrine - and, I would claim, the appellate review model - 
all fit this description.162 This is not to say that academic writing is irrele- 
vant. Academic commentary is an important source of feedback for the 
courts. When the courts venture down a new path and academics cheer, 
this undoubtedly increases the odds that the novelty will be perpetuated. 
When the courts innovate and the academics jeer, it is more likely that 
the courts will backtrack or confine the innovation to its facts. 
Although no academic served as impresario for the appellate review 
model, it had a cheerleader - and a very effective one at that. John 
Dickinson, like the first generation of administrative law scholars, had a 
background in both political science and law.163 When he took a posi- 
tion as a lecturer in the Government Department at Harvard in 1925, he 
set to work on his magnum opus, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of 
Law .164 The book was an immediate success upon its publication in 1927, 
160. See McCraw, supra note 145, at 125 ("[T]he FTC got off to a rocky start. In no 
one's eyes did it represent a distinguished regulatory body."); McFarland, supra note 70, at 
92 ("[T]he history of judicial review of regulatory orders of the Federal Trade Commission 
clearly discloses that the judges substitute their own opinions for those of the 
commissioners o ,even when sustaining the commission, hold themselves inreadiness to 
reverse or modify orders with which they do not agree."). 
161. See McCraw, supra note 145, at 81, 125-28. 
162. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron : The Making of an Accidental 
Landmark, in Administrative Law Stories 399, 427-28 (Peter Strauss ed., 2006) (" Chevron 
. . . became great not because of inherent importance of the issue presented, but because 
the opinion happened to be written i such a way that key actors in the legal system later 
decided to make it a great case."). 
163. The biographical details are drawn from George L. Haskins, John Dickinson 
1894-1952, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1952). 
164. Dickinson, supra note 14. 
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and is still described by those who encounter it for the first time as "bril- 
liant."165 The book led in short order to his appointment as a full profes- 
sor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. He remained at Penn 
from 1929 until 1948, even while engaged in significant service in the 
New Deal, and then with the Law Department of the Pennsylvania 
Railroad. He gave up his academic position only when his responsibilities 
as Vice President and General Counsel of the railroad became all-con- 
suming. Nevertheless, throughout his busy but shortened career (he 
died at age fifty-eight), Dickinson remained a highly productive and 
respected scholar, who wrote on history, jurisprudence, and political the- 
ory as well as administrative law. 
Dickinson's 1927 book made a number of contributions that would 
have a lasting impact on the field of administrative law. First, his was the 
first treatment that made judicial review the centerpiece of the study of 
administrative law. For the founding generation of "administration" 
scholars - Wyman, Goodnow, and Freund - judicial review was a periph- 
eral issue.166 In sharp contrast, Dickinson's monograph was all about the 
court-agency relationship. Quite likely, Dickinson had no intention of 
suggesting that there is nothing else to administrative law besides the is- 
sue of judicial review - this was simply what he chose to write about. Nev- 
ertheless, it remains true that after Dickinson, the study of administrative 
law became largely synonymous with the study of judicial review. The 
field as conceived by the next generation of scholars - -Jaffe, Davis, 
Gellhorn, Schwartz, and Nathanson - bears much more resemblance to 
the subject of Dickinson's book than to the works of the first generation 
of scholars.167 
Second, Dickinson broke new ground in suggesting that judicial re- 
view was governed by a unifying set of principles.168 The idea that judi- 
165. See, e.g., Chase, supra note 47, at 171 ("The book is nothing less than 
brilliant . . . ."); Young, supra note 33, at 824 (praising Dickinson as "brilliant" and 
crediting him with "unusual powers of analysis and foresight"). 
166. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing scholars' treatment of 
constitutional status and internal organization of administrative bodies). 
167. William Chase laments the juriscentric nature of administrative law, which he 
attributes tothe influence of Harvard and the Frankfurter radition. See Chase, supra note 
47, at 106, 116. 
168. This is not immediately apparent from the organization of the book. Chapter V, 
"Practical Limits of the Supremacy of Law," concludes with the observation that he field of 
administration needs to be broken into subfields for further study. Dickinson, supra note 
14, at 155-56. Dickinson followed up with separate chapters on public utility regulation - 
principally railroads - in Chapter VI, id. at 157-202; the Federal Trade Commission i  
Chapter VIII, id. at 236-50; general police regulation in Chapter IX, id. at 251-63; and 
traditional executive functions like the distribution of lands, the post office, and 
immigration in Chapter X, id. at 264-306. But it would be a mistake to characterize the 
work as a high level treatise. Dickinson expounds his general thesis in discussing 
administrative finality in Chapter III, id. at 39-75; the supremacy of law in Chapter V, id. at 
105-56; the role of the courts in areas of social controversy in Chapter VII, id. at 203-35; 
and judicial review of questions of fact in Chapter XI, id. at 307-32. And his discussion of 
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cial review is a unified phenomenon, rather than a series of discrete 
forms of intervention governed by different forms of action, was trans- 
formative. Here we see the seed planted for the judicial review provisions 
of the Administrative Procedure Act, and for the modern study of admin- 
istrative law, which overwhelmingly regards judicial review as a unitary 
phenomenon. 
Third, Dickinson clearly perceived that the new conception of judi- 
cial review that had emerged was modeled on the judge-jury relationship 
in civil law. Consider the following passage from the chapter on judicial 
review of questions of fact: 
[Courts are recognizing] an essentially new basis of review ... at 
once broader in some respects, and narrower in others, than 
that appropriate to ultra vires. Other analogies have been 
sought, and the forms of expression most frequently employed 
are those which are borrowed from review by a court of error of 
the verdict of a jury. . . . The difficulties which arise on review of 
administrative orders are for the most part of the same nature as 
those applying to the review of verdicts.169 
Fourth, Dickinson supplied something that was missing from the 
Supreme Court's foundational decisions construing the post-Hepburn 
Act ICA: a functional justification for the new appellate review model in 
terms of what we would today call comparative institutional analysis.170 
Although he frequently and explicitly noted the analogy between the 
judge^ury relationship and the reviewing court-agency relationship, he 
also recognized that it was only an analogy, and that what was needed to 
justify the new division of functions was an argument grounded in the 
strengths and weaknesses of the respective institutions. One point he 
made with particular effectiveness was that the old de novo review model 
failed to achieve a differentiation of functions, produced delay, and was 
duplicative and wasteful.171 
judicial review in the subject areas he considers i always oriented to the general principles 
he oudines in the thematic chapters. 
169. Id. at 312. 
170. See, e.g., Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions i  Law, 
Economics, and Public Policy 3-4 (1994) (referring to "comparative institutional analysis" 
as "sophisticated comparison of [institutional choices] "); Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under 
Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation 64-67 (2006) (discussing 
"institutional choice" and "interpretive-choice analysis"). 
171. As he wrote, there was no point in allowing courts to substitute heir judgment 
for agencies 
where there is merely some difference ofopinion between them as to matters 
peculiar to the particular case, or some difference in inference from those 
matters. Such substitution does nothing to clarify a rule because it relates wholly 
to something which will be dead and done with after the particular case. It is like 
permitting the court to substitute its conclusion in place of the jury's as to 
whether the plaintiff in a negligence action did or did not see an approaching 
vehicle. If the court's "independent" judgment on such a point is to prevail, 
there would be litde use in having a jury. The argument applies with greater 
force to the finding of a commission, reached in a separate proceeding at much 
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Fifth, Dickinson seemed intuitively to appreciate that his critical au- 
dience was judges, and that what was needed was a unified conception of 
judicial review that he could sell to this audience. This he sought to do 
by stressing the critical role of judges in articulating general principles 
that would govern the regulatory state - principles that judges would im- 
pose on agencies in the name of the supremacy of law. The great virtue 
of courts was the generality of their experience and their knowledge of 
law in all its manifestations. The law applicable to a given case, he wrote, 
should be pronounced by a tribunal that knows "the whole of the law," 
that is, "by an agency whose main business is to know the law, rather than 
to enforce some part of it."172 
In effect, by conceding the "fact" part of the regulatory process to 
the agencies, and reserving the "law" part for courts, judges would be 
assigning themselves the more exalted and important function. 
Dickinson was, in this respect, a precursor of Ronald Dworkin, with his 
model of the judge as Hercules.173 The court, for Dickinson, "is the fo- 
rum of principle and, by extension, the forum of reason. It is through 
the process of judicial review that law founded on policy is subjected to 
principled, that is, 'rational' scrutiny."174 
One of Dickinson's great strengths as an expositor of a normative 
vision was his ability to acknowledge conceptual weaknesses, and then to 
build on the very conceptual base acknowledged to be flawed. Notable in 
this regard is his discussion of the law-fact distinction. In what is perhaps 
trouble and expense to both the public and the parties. The double process only 
reduplicates the uncertainty of any particular case and brings it out at the end of 
the administrative stage of the proceedings with nothing settled which is not 
liable to be overruled. . . . And meanwhile the courts, if left free to revise 
administrative determinations on no more accurate grounds than their own 
private opinions as to the facts of particular cases, will inevitably overlook that 
laborious development of general rules from case to case which is their proper 
task under a sound division of labour, and one which is essential to the 
maintenance of the supremacy of law. 
Dickinson, supra note 14, at 201-02 (footnote omitted). 
172. Id. at 124. Or as Dickinson put it in another passage: 
The technical equipment which the commissions are supposed to possess, and 
the limited and specialized nature of their work, in a measure operate to unfit 
them for the task of developing eneral rules of law. It is of the essence of legal 
rules that they should be founded on broader considerations than those which 
spring from the special class of situations to which any particular rule may apply. 
They must take into account the habits and attitude of mind of the whole 
community as gleaned from the sum-total ofits transactions. . . . [T]hey should be 
touched off into greater generality b  a tribunal which has under its jurisdiction 
the whole field of legal relations. 
Id. at 234 (footnote omitted). 
173. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 105 (1977) (describing Hercules as 
"a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen"). 
174. Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American 
Jurisprudence, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 601, 621 (1993). 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 18:59:44 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
976 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1 1 1 :939 
the most frequently quoted passage from the book, Dickinson gives the 
law-fact distinction "the usual realist acid bath"175: 
[Questions of law and fact] are not two mutually exclusive kinds 
of questions, based upon a difference of subject-matter. Matters 
of law grow downward into roots of fact, and matters of fact 
reach upward, without a break, into matters of law. The knife of 
policy alone effects an artificial cleavage at the point where the 
court chooses to draw the line between public interest and pri- 
vate right. It would seem that when the courts are unwilling to 
review, they are tempted to explain by the easy device of calling 
the question one of "fact"; and when otherwise disposed, they 
say that it is a question of "law."176 
What is not generally noted is that after debunking the traditional 
law-fact conception, Dickinson reconceptualized the distinction in terms 
of the generality of the principle involved. The more the principle for 
decision becomes one of widespread generality, the more appropriate it 
is to call it a question of law.177 The more it tends toward factors unique 
to a particular controversy, the more appropriate it is to call it a question 
of fact. Dickinson then endorsed the reconceptualized distinction as the 
core principle of judicial review. The law-fact distinction, in Dickinson's 
hands, meant that courts were to decide the big important questions, and 
agencies the small inconsequential ones. 
Another key to Dickinson's power as a proponent of the appellate 
review model was his wide-ranging scholarship, which lends his work an 
aura of definitiveness. Yet, like most exercises in academic cheerleading, 
the work was important as much for what it left out as for what it in- 
cluded. What was most noticeably downplayed was any anguish over the 
constitutionality of the appellate review model, and in particular whether 
it could be squared with the assignment of the judicial power of the 
United States to Article III judges. To be sure, Dickinson did not ignore 
separation of powers considerations entirely. This would undermine the 
credibility of his analysis, which derived in large measure from the sense 
of its completeness. His main tactic here was to argue that the purposes 
underlying the structural Constitution could be reduced to a single 
point - the need to subordinate political discretion to the rule of law - 
and that this could be assured by providing for judicial review of ques- 
tions of law.178 Here we see the origins of a major trope of modern ad- 
ministrative law: Judicial review cures all. 
175. Robert W. Gordon, Willis's American Counterparts: The Legal Realists' Defence 
of Administration, 55 U. Toronto L.J. 405, 411 (2005). 
176. Dickinson, supra note 14, at 55. 
177. See id. at 312 ("[A]ny factual state or relation which the courts conclude to 
regard as sufficiently important to be made decisive for all subsequent cases of similar 
character becomes thereby a matter of law for formulation by the court."). 
178. See id. at 74-75 (noting doctrines such as separation of powers and due process 
"are but the outworks ofan elaborate structure d vised to buttress from different sides the 
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Dickinson's indifference to the Article III implications of delegating 
the fact-finding mission to administrative agencies both reflected existing 
precedent and helped shape the Court's response when the issue finally 
came to the fore in the 1930s. There is unmistakable evidence of 
Dickinson's influence in both Crowell v. Benson 179 and St. Joseph Stockyards 
Co. v. United States 180 - two of the most significant decisions in laying to 
rest any questions about the constitutionality of the appellate review 
model. Chief Justice Hughes's majority opinion in Crowell , for example, 
deftly distinguishes between constitutional and jurisdictional facts; a sub- 
ject treated in such detail by Dickinson, that it is hard to imagine Hughes 
developing it merely by reading the scattered and contradictory case 
law.181 The opinion even uses, as an illustration of jurisdictional facts, a 
Massachusetts nuisance decision that was prominently discussed by 
Dickinson.182 Of Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion there is little 
doubt - he cites Dickinson's book twice, and faithfully follows his analy- 
sis.183 Similarly, there can be no doubt of Dickinson's influence in St. 
Joseph Stockyards , the decision that interred the notion that courts must 
independently develop a factual record in cases involving issues of consti- 
tutional fact. Dickinson wrote the brief and argued the case for the gov- 
ernment. The brief clearly develops the theme, adopted by the Court, 
that judicial exercise of independent judgment on questions of constitu- 
tional fact is enhanced, not impeded, if "aided by the sifting procedure of 
an expert legislative agency."184 
Dickinson has been characterized by modern legal historians as both 
a legal realist185 and an opponent of legal realism.186 In truth, Dickinson 
was some of both. He used realist or functional arguments to attack for- 
malisms he did not like - separation of powers, de novo review, ultra vires 
review, a mechanical application of the law-fact distinction. But he did 
not succumb to the view that all law is politics, as found in the more 
extreme versions of realism or later critical legal studies writing. Instead, 
he sought to develop new formal principles that would operate at a 
higher level of generality and produce a more satisfactory working rela- 
tionship between courts and agencies than what had gone before. 
central doctrine of the supremacy of law; and the discussion can be simplified by striking 
down to this essential issue"). 
179. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
180. 298 U.S. 38 (1936). 
181. See Crowell , 285 U.S. at 62-63. 
182. Compare id. at 59 n.29 (discussing Miller v. Horton, 126 N.E. 100 (Mass. 1891)), 
with Dickinson, supra note 14, at 107-08 (discussing Miller). 
183. Crowell , 285 U.S. at 89 n.24, 93 n.30 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
184. St. Joseph Stockyards, 298 U.S. at 53; see also Brief or the United States & the 
Secretary of Agriculture at 200, St. Joseph Stockyards , 298 U.S. 38 (No. 497) . 
185. See Gordon, supra note 175, at 405 (including Dickinson as one of the American 
realists) . 
186. See Duxbury, supra note 174, at 618 (describing Dickinson's work as having 
"basic anti-realist thrust"). 
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Proving intellectual influence is always difficult. One puzzle is why 
Dickinson is not better known among public law scholars today. Based 
on contemporary constitutional and administrative law casebooks and 
standard historical accounts, one would conclude that Dickinson never 
existed.187 A brief bibliographic entry in William Chase's study of the 
administrative law scholarship is revealing. On the one hand, Chase re- 
marks that "[t]he complexity and ambiguity of the man as suggested by 
his writings and the outline of his career are more than a little intriguing, 
but I haven't been able to gather enough satisfactory material on him to 
be sure, or even have solid hunches about, who he was intellectually."188 
This suggests that Dickinson has suffered by resisting easy categorization 
as falling into one "camp" or another. On the other hand, Chase also 
remarks that Dickinson "appears to have been considerably more discern- 
ing than his contemporaries, but unable to make the intellectual impact 
on his times that he desired, due in part at least to the inhibiting power of 
his institutional loyalties."189 This suggests that Dickinson suffered by 
staying at Penn while rebuffing overtures from Harvard and Yale, or be- 
cause he eventually abandoned academics altogether for private prac- 
tice.190 Whatever the reasons for Dickinson's relative obscurity today, it is 
important to remember that influence and enduring fame are not the 
same thing. 
Ted White has singled out Justice Louis Brandeis as playing an in- 
strumental role in the development of the modern understanding of 
agency-court relations.191 But Brandeis did not join the Court until 1920, 
well after the appellate model had been established. His original contri- 
butions to administrative law, as White details, centered on ancillary ques- 
tions like the scope of the primary jurisdiction doctrine and the law of 
standing.192 Justice Brandeis's most extensive discussion of the proper 
division of authority between courts and agencies - his dissenting opinion 
in Crowell v. Benson - owes an obvious debt to Dickinson. The path of 
influence here would seem to be from Dickinson to Brandeis, rather than 
vice versa. 
187. See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy: 
Problems, Text, and Cases (6th ed. 2006) (containing no reference to Dickinson); Gary 
Lawson, Federal Administrative Law (4th ed. 2007) (same); Jerry L. Mashaw, Richard A. 
Merrill 8c Peter M. Shane, Administrative Law: The American Public Law System (6th ed. 
2009) (same); cf. Peter L. Strauss et al., Gellhorn 8c Byse's Administrative Law: Cases and 
Comments 250, 976 (10th ed. 2003) (reproducing two passages from Dickinson's writings). 
188. Chase, supra note 47, at 171. 
189. Id. 
190. The biographical sketch of Dickinson written by Haskins reports that Dickinson 
accepted the offer from Penn while turning down an offer from Yale and an offer of 
tenured position from Princeton, and that President Conant of Harvard later offered 
Dickinson a University Chair, which e also declined. Haskins, upra note 163, at 5, 12, 22. 
191. White, supra note 3, at 196-97. 
192. Id. at 209, 242. 
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There is also reason to believe that Dickinson bears some responsibil- 
ity for the rapid eclipse of the jurisdictional fact doctrine propounded in 
Crowell. Dickinson disagreed sharply with the notion that reviewing 
courts had to make their own record in reviewing jurisdictional or consti- 
tutional facts, as his book makes clear.193 Crowell , of course, ruled to the 
contrary (although, as I have suggested, even the majority opinion is in- 
formed by Dickinson's scholarship). Dickinson quickly penned an acidic 
critique of Crowell in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review , recapitulat- 
ing the arguments of his book and bringing them to bear on the analysis 
of Crowell .194 It would not be too great an exaggeration to say that the 
specific holding of Crowell was never heard from again. Obviously, there 
are multiple reasons for this. But it is interesting that a narrow majority 
of the Court went on to do battle against the New Deal for five more 
years, and yet it did not choose to make its stand on the jurisdictional fact 
doctrine. Jeering from academics matters, especially when it comes from 
someone as persuasive as Dickinson. 
In short, Dickinson supplied what the Supreme Court's halting, im- 
provisational decisions of the post-Hepburn Act era lacked: a normative 
theory that explained why the appellate review model was a good thing. 
That the theory was surrounded by impressive scholarship and set forth 
in refined prose gave the judiciary all the more confidence that this inno- 
vation was worth perpetuating. It is also noteworthy that his influential 
book contained no discussion of Article III. 
V. The Article III Puzzle 
Modern constitutional law scholars frequendy suggest that the appel- 
late review model of administrative law violates the plain meaning of 
Article III of the Constitution.195 They argue that Article III vests the 
"judicial power of the United States" exclusively in courts composed of 
193. Dickinson, supra note 14, at 201. 
194. John Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson : Judicial Review of Administrative 
Determinations of Questions of "Constitutional F ct," 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1055, 1077-82 
(1932). 
195. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, 
and Article III, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 915, 919 (1988) [hereinafter Fallon, Of Legislative 
Courts] (suggesting literal language of Article III means "the only federal tribunals that 
can be assigned to resolve justiciable controversies are 'article III courts'"); Gary Lawson, 
The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1248 (1994) 
("Article III requires de novo review, of both fact and law, of all agency adjudication that is 
properly classified as 'judicial' activity."); Monaghan, Review, supra note 2, at 262 ("In 
terms of the constitutional design, the whole process of substituting administrative for 
judicial adjudication may be thought to suffer from a serious 'legitimacy deficit.'"); James 
E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United 
States, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 643, 646 (2004) ("[D]espite the importance of [Article III] . . . 
Congress has often assigned isputes that appear to fall within the scope of the federal 
judicial power to Article I tribunals whose judges lack salary and tenure protections."); see 
also Nelson, supra note 21, at 625 & n.257 (collecting additional sources); cf. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 859 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
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judges who enjoy life tenure and secure compensation. The judicial 
power, it is further assumed, includes the power to find both the facts and 
the law needed to resolve particular cases and controversies. The appel- 
late review model, however, calls for a sharing of this power with federal 
tribunals that do not have the independence of Article III courts. The 
appellate review model, from this perspective, represents a major chal- 
lenge: Is there a principled justification for what appears to be a violation 
of the plain requirements of the Constitution? 
In attempting to answer this puzzle, constitutional law scholars fre- 
quently turn to historical narratives. These narratives, however, generally 
ignore the period from the enactment of the Hepburn Act through the 
1920s. Instead, they tend to leap in one bound from Murray's Lessee v. 
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.196 in the mid-nineteenth century to 
Crowell v. Benson 197 on the threshold of the New Deal, as if nothing of 
significance happened in between (a mere seventy-seven years!). This is a 
mistake. It is a mistake not because this history reveals the answer to the 
puzzle, but because it shows that the puzzle that consumes modern schol- 
ars was simply not a matter of significant concern to judges and scholars 
during the critical period when the appellate review model emerged. To- 
day, judges and scholars worry about the dilution of the authority of 
Article III courts. During the earlier era, the primary concern was that 
Article III courts would be drawn into matters of "administration" that 
were not properly judicial. In other words, the concern was not dilution 
of the judicial power but contamination of that power. The appellate 
review model succeeded in part because it provided a solution to the con- 
tamination problem. 
The standard narrative also posits that the critical decision which 
opened the door to agency adjudication was Crowell v. Benson , decided in 
1932. Crowell is said to be the "first case that broadly approved transfers 
of trial jurisdiction from courts to agencies,"198 making it the "fountain- 
head" for later decisions legitimating the role of the modern administra- 
tive agencies,199 thereby "pav[ing] the way" for administrative agencies to 
act as adjudicators of a wide array of statutory claims.200 Once Crowell 
broke through the logjam of the knotty Article III problem, the story 
goes, the path was open for the massive expansion of the administrative 
state during the New Deal. 
The most immediate problem with this view of history is that, as we 
have seen, courts abandoned de novo review of agency adjudication more 
than two decades before Crowell. Compounding the difficulty with the 
("On its face, Article III, § 1, seems to prohibit the vesting of an)? judicial functions in 
either the Legislative or the Executive Branch."). 
196. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855). 
197. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
198. Young, supra note 33, at 779. 
199. Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, supra note 195, at 923. 
200. Nelson, supra note 21, at 602. 
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standard narrative, when we attend closely to Crowell we discover that 
none of the Justices had any quarrel with the use of the appellate review 
model in routine administrative adjudications of controversies involving 
private rights, such as ICC rate cases. The only point of division among 
the Justices was whether the appellate review model could be applied to 
so-called "jurisdictional" facts; in particular, whether the record on which 
the jurisdictional facts were determined had to be developed by the re- 
viewing court rather than the agency.201 All of the Justices in Crowell took 
it for granted that the appellate review model was unproblematic insofar 
as it applied to ordinary, "nonjurisdictional" facts, even in matters con- 
cededly involving private rights, both in the sense that the record for re- 
view would be the one developed by the agency, and in the sense that the 
standard of review would be a deferential jury-review type standard.202 
However, the opinions in Crowell provide no persuasive justification - at 
least none that modern commentators find fully persuasive - for the as- 
sumption that agency determination of routine facts can be squared with 
Article III. As Gordon Young puts it, the implausibility of the Court's 
explanation for how the appellate review model squares with Article III 
generates a deeper "mystery" as to "how the view advanced in Crowell be- 
came so clear to such distinguished Justices and scholars by 1932, months 
before the New Deal and years before Court-packing pressures."203 
A. Modern Attempts To Solve the Article III Puzzle 
Contemporary courts and scholars have offered essentially two types 
of theories in an effort to reconcile Article III with the widespread prac- 
tice of conferring adjudicatory authority on non-Article III administrative 
agencies. These can be called the adjunct theory and the public rights 
theory. 
1. Adjunct Theory. - The adjunct theory builds on the brief analysis 
offered by Chief Justice Hughes in Crowell. Hughes described administra- 
tive agencies like the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation 
Commission as functioning as "adjuncts" to courts, in a manner analo- 
gous to the way juries function in trials at law or masters in chancery 
function in cases at equity.204 The adjunct decides questions of routine 
201. Crowell , 285 U.S. at 66 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating the "primary question" 
presented was, "Upon what record shall the district court's review of the order of the 
deputy commissioner bebased?"). 
202. Id. at 58 (majority opinion) (stating "question of the conclusiveness of . . . 
administrative findings of fact generally arises where the facts are clearly not jurisdictional 
and the scope of review as to such facts has been determined by the applicable legislation" 
but not "where the question concerns the proper exercise of the judicial power of the 
United States in enforcing constitutional limitations" (footnote omitted)). 
203. Young, supra note 33, at 774. 
204. See Crowell , 285 U.S. at 51-54 ("While the reports of masters and 
commissioners . . . are essentially of an advisory nature, it has not been the practice to 
disturb their findings when they are properly based upon evidence, in the absence of 
errors of law . . . ."). 
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fact, subject to instruction and oversight by the court. The court then 
reviews the adjunct's findings to assure they have decided within the 
bounds of reason, meanwhile reserving for itself all questions of constitu- 
tionality, jurisdiction, and law. Under this conception, ultimate deci- 
sional power remains with the Article III court; the agency merely sup- 
plies inputs on one dimension - finding adjudicative facts - where it has 
certain comparative advantages and enjoys the sanction of historical anal- 
ogies to the jury and masters in chancery. 
The adjunct theory has a number of serious weaknesses. One is that 
juries and masters in chancery have a direct basis in the constitutional 
text, whereas adjudication by federal administrative agencies does not. 
Juries are mentioned both in Article III and in the Bill of Rights; indeed, 
trial by jury is required by the Constitution not only in criminal cases,205 
but also in civil cases involving more than twenty dollars where a jury 
would decide the matter at common law.206 Article III expressly confers 
authority on federal courts in cases of equity, where masters in chancery 
had historically been used.207 Thus, there is an "intratextual" basis for 
recognizing an exception to Article III for factfinding by juries and mas- 
ters in chancery.208 No such textual basis exists, however, for conferring 
factfinding authority on federal administrative agencies. 
Another weakness is that adjudication by federal administrative agen- 
cies often carries far more legal significance than factfinding by juries or 
masters in chancery. Chief Justice Hughes's analogy had some plausibil- 
ity as a description of the early ICC or the FTC, neither of which had 
authority to enforce its own orders and had to file a bill in equity seeking 
enforcement. But it had no plausibility as a description of the most im- 
portant agency of the era when Crowell was decided - the post-Hepburn 
Act ICC - which could issue a rate prescription order on its own authority 
which became legally binding unless a carrier could persuade a court to 
issue an injunction staying it.209 No jury or master has such power. Simi- 
larly, large numbers of agency adjudicators today - including every ad- 
ministrative law judge employed by the Social Security 
Administration210 - has the power to issue self-executing orders. 
Modern commentators, most prominently Richard Fallon, have 
sought to rehabilitate the adjunct theory by defining the "judicial power 
205. U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. VI. 
206. Id. amend. VII. 
207. Id. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1. 
208. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112Harv. L. Rev. 747 (1999) 
(developing idea that constitutional provisions can be interpreted by examining other 
constitutional provisions) . 
209. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72 (discussing reform legislation by 
which orders became self-executing). 
210. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (2006) (declaring that findings and decision of 
Commissioner ofSocial Security after hearing "shall be binding upon all individuals who 
were parties to such hearing"); § 405(1) (permitting Commissioner to delegate this power 
to any officer or employee of Social Security Administration) . 
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of the United States" to mean, simply, the power to engage in appellate 
review of decisions by other tribunals in cases arising under federal 
law.211 This is ingenious, and has the advantage of constitutionalizing the 
appellate review model, since Article III would command nothing more 
than appellate review. Nevertheless, this revised version of the adjunct 
theory also suffers from shortcomings. 
For one thing, it puts unwarranted emphasis on the resolution of 
questions of federal law as the dominant objective of Article III. Article 
III lists not only cases arising under federal law as lying within the judicial 
power of the United States, but also cases and controversies between two 
or more states, cases involving ambassadors and other ministers and con- 
suls, cases between citizens of different states, cases between citizens of 
one state and another state, cases involving admiralty and maritime is- 
sues, and cases involving land grants from different states.212 Many or 
most of these categories of cases would be (and have been) resolved 
under state (or international) law. They were included within the scope 
of the judicial power of the United States presumably because the 
Framers thought it important to provide an impartial federal tribunal for 
their resolution, not to assure the supremacy of federal law. So the equa- 
tion of the "judicial power" with appellate review in cases arising under 
federal law rests uneasily with the whole text of Article III. 
The revised adjunct theory, like Chief Justice Hughes's original ver- 
sion, also fails to account for the fact that agency orders commonly re- 
solve questions of federal law that otherwise could be determined by an 
Article III court. Insofar as agency orders are self-executing, and judicial 
review is discretionary at the instance of an aggrieved party, not 
mandatory, then the whole controversy will often be resolved by a non- 
Article III tribunal. When this happens, the parties' federal rights are 
determined in a binding agency order without any input at all from an 
Article III court. It is also possible, of course, for Congress to make cer- 
tain matters decided by federal administrative agencies unreviewable by 
any Article III court, which necessarily means no appellate review by 
Article III courts of questions of federal law.213 These exceptions are 
211. See Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, supra note 195, at 943-49; see also Martin H. 
Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 
1983 Duke L.J. 197, 226-28 (tentatively ndorsing thesis that Article III is satisfied provided 
appellate review by Article III tribunals on questions of federal law is available). Although 
he distinguishes his approach from the appellate review idea, I also regard Professor James 
Pfander's "inferior t ibunals" theory as falling into the revised adjunct category, broadly 
defined. See Pfander, supra note 195, at 671-97 (setting forth inferior tribunals account 
of Article III). 
212. U.S. Const, art III, § 2, cl. 1. 
213. See 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2006) (contemplating Congress may by law "preclude 
judicial review" or may draft statutes such that "agency action is committed to agency 
discretion by law"). For discussion of a recent enactment which cut off all review, state and 
federal, of compliance with law in the construction f a border fence between Mexico and 
the United States, see Thomas W. Merrill, Delegation and Judicial Review, 33 Harv. J.L. & 
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hard to square with a revised definition of the judicial power as requiring 
appellate review by Article III tribunals of all questions of federal law de- 
cided by non-Article III tribunals. 
2. Public Rights Theory. - The second principal effort by contempo- 
rary scholars to reconcile agency adjudication with Article III draws on 
the distinction between public and private rights. The distinction is al- 
luded to in Murray's Lessee ,214 and gained traction in the wake of the 
Court's 1982 decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co.215 Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline sought 
to bring order to Article III jurisprudence by positing that all adjudica- 
tion by federal tribunals must take place in Article III courts, subject to 
three historically grounded "narrow situations": adjudication by territo- 
rial courts, by military tribunals, and by administrative agencies with re- 
spect to matters of "public" rather than "private" rights.216 As should be 
clear, the public rights exception is key under this account to reconciling 
agency adjudication with Article III. Unfortunately, Justice Brennan was 
less than clear about what makes a right "public" rather than private. He 
suggested variously that public rights are limited to disputes in which the 
government is a party, often have a connection to sovereign immunity, 
often involve tax and revenue collection functions, and often entail statu- 
tory functions that could be performed exclusively by the executive or 
legislative departments.217 
Scholars have taken up the challenge of developing a more precise 
conception of public rights, and of explaining how the historical under- 
standing of the public rights exception can square agency adjudication 
with Article III. Gordon Young and Caleb Nelson have offered the most 
thorough efforts in pursuit of this objective.218 I will concentrate here on 
their accounts of how the public rights exception was applied at the dawn 
of the modern administrative age, and in particular on how the post- 
Hepburn Act decisions involving review of ICC rate cases are consistent 
with a public rights exception. 
The Young-Nelson historical argument is based on the differential 
treatment in the Hepburn Act between the provisions for review of rate 
prescription orders and reparations orders. As we have seen, the Act pro- 
vided no standard of review for actions seeking to enjoin a rate prescrip- 
tion order, and the Supreme Court devised the appellate review standard 
Pub. Pol'y 73 (2010) (discussing the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996). 
214. See 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855) ("[T]here are matters, involving public 
rights, which may be presented in such form that he judicial power is capable of acting on 
them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may or may 
not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem 
proper."). 
215. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
216. Id. at 63-70 (plurality opinion). 
217. Id. at 67-70. 
218. Nelson, supra note 21; Young, supra note 33. 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 18:59:44 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
201 1 ] APPELLATE REVIEW MODEL 985 
to fill this gap.219 With respect to reparations actions, however, the Act 
instructed courts to treat the action "in all respects like other civil suits 
for damages," except that orders were to be regarded as "prima facie evi- 
dence" of the facts determined therein.220 From this, Young and Nelson 
infer that reparations actions - claims for damages based on rates 
charged in the past - were regarded as implicating private rights and 
hence as necessitating full judicial determination of all contested issues of 
law and fact. Rate prescription orders, in contrast, which set maximum 
reasonable rates that could be charged in the future, were regarded as 
public rights and hence could be resolved by a tribunal that did not con- 
form to the requirements of Article III.221 
There is little support for this argument in contemporary sources. 
Both authors rely on a footnote in Leo Sharfman 's multivolume treatise 
on the ICC.222 Sharfman, however, does not address the Article III prob- 
lem, nor does he explicitly invoke the private rights-public rights distinc- 
tion. He does observe that the "special treatment" for cases involving the 
payment of money may be explained by the fact that "they are concerned 
exclusively with past transactions, and that they are designed to afford 
private redress to particular parties, rather than to further public ends 
through the process of regulation."223 Sharfman, in turn, cites a passage 
from a treatise by Ernst Freund, which Young and Nelson also cite. 
Freund does mention, without elaboration, that having an administrative 
agency determine claims for money damages for past transactions is 
something of an "anomaly," and is in tension with the constitutional right 
of trial by jury.224 But he, like Sharfman, makes no mention of Article III, 
or the public rights-private rights distinction. 
Neither Young nor Nelson, nor for that matter Sharfman or Freund, 
considers the legislative history of the Hepburn Act in connection with 
the reparations versus rate prescription distinction. There is nothing in 
that history to suggest that Congress invested great significance in the 
past-future distinction, or regarded actions for prescription orders as en- 
tailing public rights whereas actions for reparations involved private 
rights. To the contrary, the senators who debated the provisions at great 
length assumed that the ICC would commonly deal with the past and the 
future in a single order.225 The Commission would determine what was a 
reasonable rate; it would then issue an order prescribing this rate for the 
219. See supra Part II.B-C (noting failure of Congress to add standard of review to 
Hepburn Act and subsequent creation of appellate review standard by Supreme Court). 
220. Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, § 5, 36 Stat. 584, 591 (1906); see also supra text 
accompanying otes 40-42. 
221. See Nelson, supra note 21, at 594-98; Young, supra note 33, at 813-23. 
222. 2 Sharfman, supra note 76, at 387 n.64; see also Nelson, supra note 21, at 598 
(discussing Young's citation of Sharfman); Young, supra note 33, at 785 (citing Sharfman). 
223. 2 Sharfman, supra note 76, at 387 n.64. 
224. Freund, Administrative Powers, supra note 32, at 12-13. 
225. See 40 Cong. Rec. 3105 (1906) (statement of Sen. Joseph B. Foraker) ("[The 
Hepburn Bill] makes the order of the Commission condemning a rate effective and 
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future and awarding reparations to the extent past rates exceeded this 
level.226 The critical matter was the Commission's determination of a rea- 
sonable rate, not the differential remedial implications of that order for 
the past and the future.227 
Nor do post-Hepburn decisions of the Supreme Court contain any 
suggestion that backward-looking ICC orders implicate private rights 
whereas forward-looking ICC orders enforce public rights. To the extent 
the Court offered a conceptual understanding of the distinction, it said 
that reparations orders were "judicial" in nature whereas prescription or- 
ders were "legislative" in nature.228 But both were regarded as affording 
"a private administrative remedy" for "the violation of the private 
right."229 Moreover, as previously noted,230 the Supreme Court's cases 
involving reparations claims quickly gravitated toward the appellate re- 
view model in the years after the Hepburn Act. Judicial supplementation 
of the record, while theoretically available, was discouraged in practice, 
and courts were instructed to accept the ICC's determination of ques- 
tions of "evidential" fact as long as they were supported by substantial 
evidence. Eventually, the standard of review in reparations cases became 
another variant on the idea of substantial evidence review.231 All this 
happened well before the decision in Crowell .232 
Finally, the idea that ICC rate prescription orders are matters of 
"public right" whereas reparations orders were matters of "private right" 
has little to commend it. The fact that prescription orders were prospec- 
thereby disposes of that rate, and then authorizes the Commission toname a new rate and 
put it into operation in place of the condemned rate."). 
226. Subsequent practice confirmed this expectation. See, e.g., ICC v. Louisville 8c 
Nashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 90 (1913) ("[T]he Commission made a single order in 
which it found the class rates complained of to be unreasonable, directed the old locals to 
be restored and a corresponding reduction made in the through rates."). 
227. The most plausible explanation for the perpetuation of the original ICA 
provisions in reparation actions is that Congress assumed the ICC could not enforce an 
order for the payment of money, but instead needed a court o issue such an order. But 
there is no discussion of this in the legislative history. 
228. See Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 384 
(1932) (distinguishing rate prescription orders and rate reparations orders); Prentis v.Ad. 
Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908) ("The establishment of a rate is the making of a 
rule for the future, and therefore is an act legislative not judicial in kind . . . ."). 
229. FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 26 (1929). 
230. See supra notes 139-143 and accompanying text (describing increasing weight 
given to agency determinations by courts). 
231. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
232. On the threshold of its decision in Crowell , the Supreme Court characterized the 
function of the ICC in reparations cases as being "judicial in its nature," and noted that 
Congress had altered the common law by "lodging in the Commission the power 
theretofore exercised by courts." Ariz. Grocery, 284 U.S. at 384, 389. There was no 
suggestion that his was constitutionally problematic, or that courts had to exercise de novo 
review over reparation actions in order to preserve Article III. See also Tagg Bros. & 
Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 443-44 8c n.4 (1930) (broadly characterizing all 
ICC cases as following appellate review model). 
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tive does not distinguish them from matters subject to the "judicial 
power." Article III pointedly specifies that the judicial power extends to 
all cases "in Law and Equity,"233 and courts sitting in equity characteristi- 
cally issue prospective orders. It is true that a rate prescription order 
would inure to the benefit of any shipper who wanted to avail itself of the 
same service covered by the prescription order. In this respect, a rate 
prescription order has a "public" quality not present in a judicial injunc- 
tion, which is in personam. In practice, however, nearly all actions 
brought before the ICC, whether for a prescription order or repara- 
tions - or both - pitted a private shipper against a private railroad com- 
pany, and determined how much money the shipper had to pay the car- 
rier for specific services. These were not "public" actions in the sense that 
the federal government was a party to these proceedings. Nor were they 
"public" in the sense that Congress had to waive sovereign immunity to 
permit the action to proceed, or in the sense that the outcome would 
have direct implications for the public fisc.234 To top it off, an ICC order, 
whether requiring reparations or prescribing a rate for the future, was a 
direct substitute for a common law action - a substitute which Abilene 
Cotton Oil held to be preemptive of the common law action.235 
On virtually any plausible theory of what it means to adjudicate pri- 
vate rights, the post-Hepburn Act ICC was involved in adjudicating pri- 
vate rights. So, if agency adjudication presents a problem in terms of 
usurping Article Ill's grant of the judicial power to federal courts to re- 
solve matters of private rights, the problem was fully presented in 1906, 
well before Crowell was decided. Whatever its merits as a purely normative 
theory, the public rights exception cannot explain the emergence and 
judicial acceptance of the appellate review model. 
B. Article III and Fear of Judicial Contamination 
The ease with which all Justices in Crowell v. Benson accepted the idea 
of administrative agencies deciding issues of fact subject only to deferen- 
tial review by Article III courts thus remains a mystery under the principal 
modern theories. The answer to the mystery starts with the nineteenth- 
century understanding of separation of powers, an understanding which 
continued to dominate judicial thinking during the period in question 
and still has a presence today in what is called the "formalist" view.236 
233. U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2. 
234. Cf. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-70 (1982) 
(describing bases for public rights doctrine, including sovereign immunity). 
235. Tex. 8c Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907). 
236. For discussion of formalism in separation of powers see generally John F. 
Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming 
2011) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)', Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional 
Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 Sup. Ct. Rev. 225 [hereinafter Merrill, 
Constitutional Principle]; Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to 
Separation-of-Powers Que tions - A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488 (1987). 
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According to this traditional understanding, separation of powers re- 
quires the establishment and maintenance of three separate and no- 
noverlapping spheres of power: the legislative, executive, and judicial.237 
The "judicial power," as one of the three spheres of power, can neither be 
reduced nor expanded at the expense of either the "executive" or the 
"legislative" spheres. This conception of the judicial power would be vio- 
lated by taking a chunk of the business of the courts - say determining 
whether A is liable to B for breach of contract - and transferring that 
authority to an administrative agency. Such a transfer would reduce the 
sphere of the judicial power. But the traditional conception of separated 
powers would also be violated if courts had authority to exercise powers 
which properly belonged to either the executive or the legislative sphere. 
This vision of separated powers had considerable hold over the legal 
mind during the period in which the appellate review model emerged 
and solidified. To see this, one need go no further than the 
mid-nineteenth century decision in Murray's Lessee , often invoked as a 
foundational precedent in forging the modern understanding of Article 
III.238 At issue in Murray's Lessee was the constitutionality of a seizure of 
property of Samuel Swartwout, a New York collector of customs who had 
defalcated large sums of money owed to the United States Treasury and 
fled to England. The United States, using a summary executive process, 
attached his property first; another creditor claimed this process was inva- 
lid and that its later-filed judicial claim should have priority. The disap- 
pointed creditor argued that the attachment by the United States was an 
inherently judicial act which required a proceeding before an Article III 
court. Further, the creditor pointed out that Congress, by statute, had 
made the executive seizure subject to judicial review in an Article III 
court, which the creditor cited as confirmation that the attachment was 
inherently judicial in nature.239 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Curtis rejected the Article III 
claim. He posited that there are some actions that Congress can assign 
either to the executive or the courts, as it sees fit.240 Included in this 
category are attachments of property to satisfy a debt owed to the govern- 
ment. The proceedings in court were fully compatible with the exercise 
of the judicial power because "every fact upon which the legality of the 
extrajudicial remedy" turned could be "drawn in question" in the subse- 
237. See, e.g., Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825) ("[T]he 
legislature makes, the executive xecutes, and the judiciary construes the law . . . ."); 
Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1792) (stating under the Constitution the 
federal government "is divided into three distinct and independent branches, and that it is 
the duty of each to abstain from, and to oppose, encroachments oneither"). 
238. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 
(1855). 
239. Id. at 274-76. 
240. Id. at 284 ("[T]here are matters, involving public rights . . . which are susceptible 
of judicial determination, but which congress may or may not bring within the cognizance 
of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper."). 
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quent suit against the defending federal officer.241 In other words, the 
judicial review was in the form of an officer suit in which all issues would 
be determined de novo. 
Here we see both the influence of the separate spheres understand- 
ing, and the way the nineteenth-century judicial mind went about recon- 
ciling judicial review with the separate spheres assumption. Authority 
that can be exercised by either the courts or the executive, as Congress 
sees fit, does not represent an impermissible mixing of spheres, so long as 
the executive determination is complete, final, and fully effective on its 
own terms, and the judicial consideration is by an original proceeding in 
which the court decides all facts and legal issues de novo.242 The consti- 
tutional underpinnings of the orthodox nineteenth-century conception 
of judicial review are clearly revealed. 
In dicta near the end of the Article III discussion, Justice Curtis made 
the separate spheres assumption explicit. He said in part: 
To avoid misconstruction upon so grave a subject, we think it 
proper to state that we do not consider congress can either with- 
draw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its na- 
ture, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or 
admiralty; nor, on the other hand, can it bring under the judi- 
cial power a matter which, from its nature, is not a subject for 
judicial determination.243 
The first part of this dictum is an acknowledgement that reduction 
of the judicial sphere is not permitted. Such a statement in a Supreme 
Court opinion is rare prior to Crowell v. Benson. The second part, warning 
that Congress could not bring under the judicial power matters not fit for 
judicial determination, is a statement that extension of the judicial power 
into other spheres would also be impermissible. Such statements would 
loom much larger in the thinking of the Court in the ensuing decades. 
Today, those who fret about dilution of judicial power can easily see 
that the appellate review model is in tension with the proposition that the 
judicial power may not be reduced. But during the period when the ap- 
pellate review model came to the fore, the focus of attention was not on 
the dangers of reducing judicial power, but rather on the risk of imper- 
missible augmentation of the judicial power into areas properly regarded 
as belonging to a different sphere of authority. The simple explanation 
for why the danger of dilution went largely unrecognized is that none of 
the "exceptions" to Article III adjudication that arose in the nineteenth 
century presented any kind of threat to the dignity and power of the fed- 
eral courts. The business of the territorial courts, it was assumed, would 
241. Id. 
242. Bruce Wyman's treatise, written i 1903, lays all this out. See Wyman, supra note 
48, at 321-41 (recounting case law in which "alternative" review occurred). Wyman's term 
for what we would call judicial review is"alternative" consideration, i.e., consideration first 
by the executive and then by the judiciary. 
243. Murray's Lessee , 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284. 
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eventually fall to the Article III courts as the territories became settled 
and were organized as states. (Who would want to ride circuit in a wild 
and distant territory in any event?) And the Article III courts had no 
interest in taking over military courts-martial or getting involved in the 
distribution of federal public lands. The judicial response to the ICC un- 
doubtedly elicited more complex reactions. But at least around the time 
of the enactment of the Hepburn Act, the Court was eager to get out of 
the business of engaging in de novo review of ICC decisions. The emer- 
gence of the appellate review model in this context did not raise any im- 
mediate concerns about displacement of the authority of Article III 
courts. 
The more immediate problem presented by the appellate review 
model was the fear of contamination - of drawing federal courts into mat- 
ters regarded as being the province of the other branches of government. 
Fear of displacement appeared in the nineteenth century and early twen- 
tieth century only rarely, and it was cited as an abstract or theoretical 
proposition - as in Murray's Lessee.244 Fear of contamination was a much 
more pronounced theme. 
One prominent example of this fear is seen in the judicial response 
to schemes which placed the federal courts in a position of subordination 
to an executive official. Hayburn's Case is the earliest and best known in- 
stance of this.245 The circuit courts were asked to determine and issue 
written opinions on whether wounded Revolutionary War veterans were 
entitled to pensions; these opinions were then sent to the Secretary of 
War, who could decide not to pay if he suspected fraud or mistake. Vari- 
ous Justices riding circuit refused to take part in the scheme because it 
subjected judicial judgments to potential executive nullification. This was 
seen as subordinating the judiciary to the executive, in violation of the 
separate spheres assumption.246 The principle was reaffirmed in later 
cases holding that the Court would not review judgments of the Claims 
Court subject to payment at the discretion of the Secretary of the 
Treasury.247 
244. See id. ("[W]e do not consider congress can . . . withdraw from judicial 
cognizance any matter which, from its nature, isthe subject of a suit at the common law, or 
in equity, or admiralty . . . ."). 
245. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). 
246. See Fallon et al., The Federal Courts, supra note 24, at 83-93 (questioning 
whether prohibition against executive revision of judicial decisions rested on "judicial 
dignity and a desire to keep face, or on more fundamental concerns about the integrity of 
the judicial process") . 
247. See Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561, 561 (1864) (finding lack of 
jurisdiction over appeal from Court of Claims where petitioner sought damages for injury 
caused by government troops); cf. United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 45-47 
(1851) (finding district court's determination fclaims arising under Treaty of 1819, 
subsequently reviewed by Secretary of Treasury, to be "award of a commissioner" and not 
"judgment of a court of justice"). 
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Fear of contamination also arose where it appeared that the courts 
were being asked to validate or revise administrative action. I have al- 
ready alluded to decisions in the public lands area where the Court re- 
fused to allow federal courts to hear "appeals" from land commissions.248 
The Court got around the objection in the California Lands Commission 
cases by insisting that the proceeding in the district court would be de 
novo.249 As Justice Matthews later explained, Article III courts have no 
right to control, to reserve, and to dictate the procedure and 
action of executive officers .... Such a function is not judicial; it 
is administrative, executive and political in nature. The abstract 
right to interfere in such cases has been uniformly denied by 
judicial tribunals, as breaking down the distinction so important 
and well defined in our system between the several, separate, 
and independent branches of the government.250 
Similar concerns were reflected in decisions refusing to permit 
Article III courts to hear appeals from the courts of the District of Colum- 
bia reviewing patent and trademark decisions,251 or appeals from the 
Court of Customs Appeals.252 In each case, it was held that an Article III 
court could not review by appeal a judgment of an Article I or legislative 
court without impairing the independence of the judicial authority. 
A particularly revealing decision from the time approaching the era 
when the appellate review model emerged was ICC v. Brimson .25S The 
Commission was conducting an investigation into whether the Illinois 
Steel Company, through various subsidiaries, was engaged in interstate 
transportation without complying with the ICA. Pursuant to section 12 of 
the ICA, the Commission issued subpoenas for documents to officers of 
the company, but they refused to comply. The Commission then filed an 
action in circuit court, seeking judicial enforcement of the subpoenas. 
The circuit court held that section 12 violated Article III of the Constitu- 
tion. A present-day devotee of Article III jurisprudence might assume 
that the argument was that the ICC, as an administrative agency, could 
not issue subpoenas for documents, because this is a judicial function 
248. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (highlighting lack of review of 
Lands Office decisions except in narrow situations) . 
249. See Grisar v. McDowell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 363, 375 (1867); United States v. 
Ritchie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 525, 533-34 (1854). 
250. Craig v. Leitensdorfer, 123 U.S. 189, 211 (1887). 
251. See Postum Cereal Co. v. Cal. Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693, 700 (1927) ("[W]hile 
Congress in its constitutional exercise . . . may clothe the courts of the District . . . with such 
authority as a State might confer on her courts ... it may not do so with . . . any federal 
court established under Article III . . . (citation omitted)). 
252. See Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 458-59 (1929) (finding Court of 
Customs Appeals to be a legislative court whose determinations could be made "with no 
recourse to judicial proceedings"). Congress later disagreed with this characterization of 
the Court of Claims, declaring it to be an Article III court. The Supreme Court, in a 
fractured decision, acquiesced in this view. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 584 
(1962) (plurality opinion). 
253. 154 U.S. 447 (1893). 
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reserved for courts. But, in fact, the argument was the exact opposite: 
The circuit court, as an Article III tribunal, could not allow itself to be 
drawn into the process of assisting the Commission in gathering informa- 
tion, because this was an "administrative" rather than a judicial func- 
tion.254 The Supreme Court found the case to be a close one, and re- 
jected the Article III contamination argument by a vote of five to four. 
Justice Harlan's majority opinion took great pains to distinguish 
Hayburn 's Case and similar controversies where courts were asked to make 
determinations that were not "properly judicial" because they were sub- 
ject to override by executive or legislative officials.255 
C. The Appellate Review Solution 
The appellate review model, in a roundabout way, eventually came to 
be seen as the solution to the fear of contamination if Article III courts 
were drawn into matters of administration. The solution was anticipated 
in an 1899 decision, United States v. Duell , in which the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a statute allowing "appeals" from the Patent Office to 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.256 To the objection 
that the Patent Office was "purely executive," and thus could not be "sub- 
jected to the revision of a judicial tribunal," the Court cited Murray's 
Lessee for the proposition that certain matters involving public rights may 
be assigned by Congress to either the executive or the judiciary for resolu- 
tion.257 Of course, Murray's Lessee assumed that any judicial determina- 
tion of such an issue following upon executive action would be de novo. 
The statute in Duell , in contrast, called for review in the nature of an 
"appeal." The Court nevertheless reasoned that with regard to patents, 
Congress was steadily moving toward recognizing "the judicial character 
of the questions involved."258 Moreover: 
the proceeding in the Court of Appeals on an appeal in an inter- 
ference controversy presents all the features of a civil case, a 
plaintiff, a defendant and a judge, and deals with a question ju- 
dicial in its nature, in respect of which the judgment of the 
court is final so far as the particular action of the Patent Office 
is concerned . . . .259 
Read for all it was worth, Duell could have led direcdy to the conclu- 
sion that judicial review of administrative action in the nature of an ap- 
peal is consistent with Article III. But the decision was not read for all it 
was worth; to the contrary, it was limited to the patent context and later 
distinguished on the ground that courts sitting in the District of 
254. Id. at 456-57. 
255. Id. at 481. 
256. 172 U.S. 576, 581-82 (1899). 
257. Id. at 582-83 (citing Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land 8c Improvement Co., 59 
U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855)). 
258. Id. at 588. 
259. Id. 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 18:59:44 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2011] APPELLATE REVIEW MODEL 993 
Columbia are "Article I" courts and hence can be given functions that 
cannot be assigned to Article III tribunals.260 Soon, the Court was assert- 
ing anew that Article III courts cannot be given power to "revise" adminis- 
trative action through appeals. The most emphatic statement of this pro- 
position occurred in Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co.261 Congress had 
adopted a statute conferring authority on a public utility commission to 
regulate electricity rates in the District of Columbia, subject to appeal to 
the courts of the District of Columbia and further review by appeal to the 
Supreme Court. The provisions for review in the District of Columbia 
courts were upheld on the ground that these were Article I courts and 
could be assigned a variety of governmental functions under Congress's 
plenary authority over the District. But the provision for further review 
by the Supreme Court was unconstitutional because "legislative or admin- 
istrative jurisdiction" could not be "conferred on this Court either di- 
rectly or by appeal."262 The cases which had adopted appellate-style re- 
view of decisions of the ICC and the FTC were distinguished on the 
ground that they permitted courts to consider "questions of law only," 
and did not allow Article III courts to revise the policy discretion con- 
ferred on the relevant agencies.263 
A breakthrough of sorts finally occurred in Old Colony Trust Co. v. 
Commissioner .264 Traditionally, federal taxpayers could obtain plenary ju- 
dicial review of tax liabilities by paying the tax and suing for a refund in 
court. Congress in 1926 adopted an alternative remedy in the form of an 
internal appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals, "an executive or administra- 
tive board," followed by an "appeal" to one of the circuit courts of appeal, 
which were concededly Article III courts.265 To the predictable objection 
that this was an unconstitutional mixing of judicial and administrative 
functions, the Court responded that "[i] t is not important whether such a 
proceeding was originally begun by an administrative or executive deter- 
260. See O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 545 (1933) ("In dealing with the 
District, Congress possesses the powers which belong to it in respect of territory within a 
state, and also the powers of a state."); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 450 & n.5 
(1929) (noting Article I courts uch as those in D.C. "may be clothed with the authority 
and charged with the duty of giving advisory decisions in proceedings which are not cases 
or controversies within the meaning of Article III"); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Co., 261 U.S. 
428, 443 (1923) ("Congress has as much power to vest courts of the District with avariety of 
jurisdiction a d powers as a state legislature has in conferring jurisdiction on its courts."). 
O'Donoghue held that District of Columbia courts were both Article I and Article III courts, 
and thus opined that they could entertain administrative appeals in their Article I capacity. 
289 U.S. at 545-46. Today, the District of Columbia has both Article III courts (the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and the U.S. District Court) and Article I courts that 
deal with "distinctively local" matters for the District. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 
389, 405-10 (1973). 
261. 261 U.S. 428. 
262. Id. at 444. 
263. Id. at 442. 
264. 279 U.S. 716 (1929). 
265. Id. at 725. 
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mination, if when it comes to the court ... it calls for the exercise of only 
the judicial power of the court upon which jurisdiction has been con- 
ferred by law."266 A tax dispute between the government and a taxpayer 
over the amount of tax due, the Court said, was a case or controversy 
appropriate for judicial resolution. Indeed, the jurisdiction conferred 
was "quite like that of Circuit Courts of Appeals in review of orders of the 
Federal Trade Commission."267 As in those cases, the Court observed 
without further elaboration, "[it] is not necessary that the proceeding to 
be judicial should be one entirely de novo ."268 
The Article III contamination problem was finally laid to rest by a 
pair of cases arising under the judicial review provisions of the Radio Act 
of 1927. That Act authorized a disappointed party to "appeal" from 
decisions of the Radio Commission (the forerunner of the Federal 
Communications Commission) to the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, and permitted that court to "alter or revise the decision ap- 
pealed from and enter such judgment as to it may seem just."269 In Fed- 
eral Radio Commission v. General Electric Co ., the Court, following the logic 
of Keller , held that it would violate Article III to permit the Supreme 
Court to hear appeals from such judgments, because this would convert 
the Court into "a superior and revising agency," and render its decision 
administrative rather than judicial in nature.270 
Congress responded to the decision by amending the statute to con- 
form to the precepts the Court had upheld in reviewing ICC and FTC 
decisions and in sustaining judicial review of the Board of Tax Appeals. 
The revised statute authorized the court of appeals to review only "ques- 
tions of law" and provided "that findings of fact by the commission, if 
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive unless it shall 
clearly appear that the findings of the commission are arbitrary and capri- 
cious."271 The Court held that it could entertain appeals from such judg- 
ments consistent with Article III in Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. 
Bond & Mortgage Co.272 The new version of the Act, the Court reasoned, 
confined the court of appeals to performing "judicial, as distinguished 
from administrative, review."273 In what can serve as concise summation 
of the tenets of the appellative review model, the Court explained: 
Whether the Commission applies the legislative standards validly 
set up, whether it acts within the authority conferred or goes 
beyond it, whether its proceedings satisfy the pertinent demands 
of due process, whether, in short, there is compliance with the 
266. Id. at 722. 
267. Id. at 723. 
268. Id. 
269. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 16, 44 Stat. 1162, 1699, amended by ch. 788, 46 
Stat. 844 (1930) (repealed 1934). 
270. 281 U.S. 464, 467 (1930). 
271. 46 Stat, at 844. 
272. 289 U.S. 266 (1933). 
273. Id. at 276. 
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legal requirements which fix the province of the Commission 
and govern its action, are appropriate questions for judicial de- 
cision. These are questions of law upon which the Court is to 
pass. The provision that the Commission's findings of fact, if 
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive unless it 
clearly appears that the findings are arbitrary or capricious, can- 
not be regarded as an attempt to vest in the Court an authority 
to revise the action of the Commission from an administrative 
standpoint and to make an administrative judgment. A finding 
without substantial evidence to support it - an arbitrary or capri- 
cious finding - does violence to the law. It is without the sanc- 
tion of the authority conferred. And an inquiry into the facts 
before the Commission, in order to ascertain whether its find- 
ings are thus vitiated, belongs to the judicial province and does 
not trench upon, or involve the exercise of, administrative au- 
thority. Such an examination is not concerned with the weight 
of evidence or with the wisdom or expediency of the administra- 
tive action.274 
Nelson Bros, thus articulates the critical understanding that served to 
resolve any doubts about the constitutionality of the appellate review 
model under Article III - at least insofar as the problem was contamina- 
tion of judicial authority. As long as the function of a court is truly appel- 
late in nature, that is to say, as long as the court reviews a record and 
resolves the same kinds of questions it would resolve in reviewing a record 
generated by a trial court, the reviewing court is acting in a perfectly judi- 
cial manner. 
In light of the foregoing, we can now see Crowell v. Benson , the deci- 
sion that is generally cited as the decisive turning point in overcoming 
Article III objections to agency adjudication, in a new light.275 All the 
Justices participating in Crowell , both in the majority and in dissent, as- 
sumed the validity of the appellate model for judicial review of agency 
action involving private rights. This is because that model had already 
become entrenched by the time Crowell was decided. In Crowell , Chief 
Justice Hughes adopted a modest carve-out from the appellate review 
model for facts bearing on the jurisdiction of the agency to hear the 
claim in question. He reasoned that the record supporting these facts 
should be developed in the reviewing court, rather than before the 
agency, in order to assure impartiality in policing the scope of the 
agency's activities.276 Justice Brandeis penned a lengthy dissent, which 
cited extensive authority suggesting that the agency could develop the 
record itself.277 In any event, Crowell' s suggestion that the record for re- 
274. Id. at 276-77. 
275. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
276. Id. at 54-65. 
277. Id. at 84-93 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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viewing jurisdictional facts had to be made judicially was soon 
forgotten.278 
The true significance of Crowell , in terms of the present topic, is that 
it contains the first intimation of judicial anxiety about the potential dis- 
placement of federal courts by administrative agencies. It was just an inti- 
mation. The opinion extols the virtues of administrative agencies, and 
insists that the Court had no desire "to defeat the obvious purpose of the 
legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive 
method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly 
suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency 
specially assigned to that task."279 But the Court was concerned that 
meaningful judicial review of the legal limitations on the agency's author- 
ity required a more searching review of the evidence. If Congress could 
completely vest the authority to make all findings of fact with an agency - 
including those facts necessary to establish that the agency was acting 
within the scope of its delegated power - "[t]hat would be to sap the judi- 
cial power as it exists under the Federal Constitution, and to establish a 
government of a bureaucratic character alien to our system."280 Here is a 
quick flash of doubt about what decades later would become an obsession 
in certain quarters: the possibility of doing away with Article III courts 
altogether, and replacing them with a compliant bureaucracy willing to 
do the bidding of its political superiors. 
This anxiety became a virtual neurosis with the massive expansion of 
the power of the federal courts during the Warren and Burger Court 
eras, and especially with the Court's intrusion into multiple areas of social 
controversy. The Court was well aware of the potential for backlash.281 
The most threatening form a backlash might take would be to strip 
Article III courts of jurisdiction, and transfer adjudicatory functions to 
more pliant Article I courts or agencies. Hence the perceived need to 
define a "core" of constitutionally-protected authority for Article III 
courts impervious to congressional removal. Justice Brennan's plurality 
opinion in Northern Pipeline is the ultimate manifestation of this anxi- 
ety.282 This modern obsession with securing a redoubt for judicial power 
278. In St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 53-54 (1936), in the 
context of a confiscation claim, the Court held that constitutional facts could be 
determined by the court independently based on the record generated by the agency. 
"After St. Joseph Stock Yards the independent record requirement receded into the 
constitutional shadows." Monaghan, Review, supra note 2, at 256. As previously noted, the 
government lawyer who successfully argued St. Joseph Stock Yards was none other than John 
Dickinson, then serving as Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division. St. Joseph 
Stock Yards , 298 U.S. at 41. 
279. Crowell , 285 U.S. at 46. 
280. Id. at 57. 
281. See Fallon et al., The Federal Courts, upra note 24, at 277-78 (listing numerous 
proposals to eliminate federal court jurisdiction over various issues of controversy) . 
282. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982) 
(plurality opinion) ("As an inseparable element of the constitutional system of checks and 
balances, and as a guarantee of judicial impartiality, Art. Ill both defines and protects the 
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has led commentators to search for pr e-Crowell understandings of core 
Article III authority. But the antecedents do not exist, because the anxi- 
ety did not exist. 
I am not suggesting that this historical account in any way solves the 
puzzle of agency adjudication and Article III. The puzzle will remain as 
long as we persist in reading Article III as conferring a monopoly on the 
exercise of the judicial power by Article III courts.283 What the account 
suggests, however, is the path dependent nature of our constitutional law. 
Institutions are created, and become entrenched, in response to one set 
of imperatives. Given the limits of human reason, no one perceives all 
potential complications or objections presented by these institutions. By 
the time complications or objections come to the fore, the inertia of insti- 
tutional change is too great to undo them. 
VI. Accommodating Change 
Given its inauspicious beginnings in an improvised retreat from in- 
trusive review of ICC decisions, it is truly remarkable how the appellate 
review model flourished in the century that followed. In the evolutionary 
struggle for survival among legal doctrines, this one is a clear winner. 
What accounts for its remarkable staying power? 
Part of the explanation has already been hinted at. Judges created 
the appellate review model - not Congress, the executive branch, or the 
academics. And the appellate review model, as rationalized by Dickinson, 
casts judges in the powerful role of "senior partner" in the court-agency 
relationship. Judges anxious to maximize their influence over policy, and 
to minimize their need to engage in dreary review of evidentiary records, 
should naturally be drawn to a conception of judicial review in which 
agencies find the facts and judges get to declare whether the agency's 
policy initiatives are consistent with "the law." 
Another explanation for the enduring power of the appellate review 
model is its flexibility at both the micro and macro levels. Dickinson spot- 
ted the flexibility at the micro level.284 Insofar as the reviewing institu- 
independence of the Judicial Branch."). Justice Brennan would continue to voice these 
concerns in subsequent decisions. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 
U.S. 833, 866 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (warning "Congress can seriously impair 
Article Ill's structural and individual protections without assigning away 'the entire business 
of the Article III courts.' ... It can do so by diluting the judicial power of the federal 
courts." (citation omitted)); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 599 
(1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) ("At a minimum, Article III must bar 
Congress from assigning to an Article I decisionmaker the ultimate disposition of 
challenges to the constitutionality of Government action, either legislative or executive."). 
283. Although it is not my purpose here to offer a solution to the puzzle, I have 
previously argued that the assumption the Constitution confers the "judicial power" 
exclusively on Article III courts should be reconsidered. See Merrill, Constitutional 
Principle, supra note 236, at 259-60. 
284. See Dickinson, supra note 14, at 49-55, 168-70, 203-05 (noting how courts can 
redefine questions of fact as questions of law and vice versa) . 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 18:59:44 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
998 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1 1 1 :939 
tion wants to overturn an agency decision on an issue within the sphere 
of competence of the agency, it can usually find a way to do so that sug- 
gests it is exercising its own competence. Thus, for example, the review- 
ing institution will overturn a fact-based decision by the agency by 
describing that decision as so lacking in evidence as to be "contrary to 
law." Alternatively, insofar as a court wants to uphold the decision of an 
agency, it will frame the issue in terms of the competence of the agency, 
for instance by positing that whether a carrier's practice is discriminatory 
is a "question of fact" for the agency to determine in its "sound 
discretion." 
The appellate review model has also proven to be flexible at the 
macro level. For example, in the late 1940s, control of Congress shifted 
from the Democrats to the Republicans, and Congress began criticizing 
prolabor decisions of the NLRB. No clear legislative directive emerged, 
but Justice Frankfurter was able to announce in Universal Camera Corp . v. 
NLRB that Congress had "expressed a mood" requiring more searching 
judicial review of the Board's decisions.285 That "mood" could be vindi- 
cated by tinkering with the way courts implemented the appellate review 
concept. Specifically, courts were directed to consider the weight of the 
evidence based on the entire record, not merely by looking at select evi- 
dence supporting the Board's decision. No reconsideration of the frame- 
work of review was required. 
Even greater capacity for adaptation was revealed in the 1970s, as 
Congress encouraged a shift from adjudication to rulemaking as the 
dominant mode of policymaking. This posed a potentially serious prob- 
lem for the appellate review model, given that rulemaking as originally 
conceived did not produce the closed record presupposed by the tradi- 
tional appellate review model. But courts and agencies were able to ad- 
just to overcome this difficulty, essentially by developing a new concep- 
tion of the record for purposes of review of rulemaking.286 
Similarly, when concern about agency capture became fashionable 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s,287 courts tinkered with the appellate 
review model along another dimension. They construed the role of the 
courts to include much more aggressive review of the agency's explana- 
tions for significant new policies. Thus was born hard look review.288 
285. 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951). 
286. See William F. Pederson, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 Yale 
L.J. 38, 39 (1975) (arguing "[r]ulemaking procedures should provide for compiling and 
organizing an administrative record while rulemaking is in process, with use of a discovery 
system to ensure no material which properly should be included is left out") . 
287. See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 Chi.- 
Kent L. Rev. 1039, 1059-67 (1997) (describing how "various strands of academic capture 
theory roiled together into a general pot of discontent, out of which emerged a new 
popular muckraking literature"). 
288. See generally James V. DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of 
Law and Policy, 65 Va. L. Rev. 257, 301-09 (1979) (describing need for more aggressive 
judicial monitoring of internal agency processes); Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 18:59:44 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
201 1 ] APPELLATE REVIEW MODEL 999 
Again, this approach required no fundamental alteration in the appellate 
review model. Courts simply layered a more aggressive monitoring of the 
quality of agency reasoning on top of the standard review of the factual 
record from the original model. 
Later, in response to the deregulation movement, the model was suf- 
ficiendy elastic to permit a further modification in the appropriate divi- 
sion of authority in resolving questions of law, most prominently with the 
Chevron decision in 1984.289 Chevron s two-step formula for reviewing 
questions of law can be seen as a reworking of the tried and true appel- 
late review model. Step one entails reviewing for a controlling question 
of law. Here the court exercises pure independent judgment, using 
"traditional tools" of legal interpretation to say what the law is.290 Only if 
the court finds that the law does not speak to the question does it move 
on to step two, where the agency's view, like that of a lower court's find- 
ing of fact, is reviewed for reasonableness.291 As Edward Rubin has ob- 
served, the formula 
is reminiscent of the standard that an appellate court uses when 
reviewing a bench trial: the appellate court will review questions 
of law de novo, but will recognize a zone of discretion for mat- 
ters that lie within the special expertise of the trial court, and 
will reverse only if the trial court's decision is "clearly 
erroneous."292 
This would have come as no surprise to Dickinson. As he explained 
in 1927, judicial deference to agency determinations of law is compatible 
with the model, as long as the issues of law are sufficiently narrow and 
technical as to fall into the sphere of superior competence of the agency 
rather than the court.293 This is consistent with the common sense un- 
derstanding of Chevron shared by most judges, even if the theoretical 
grounds of that decision authorize a much greater transfer of authority 
over questions of law to agencies. 
These and other transformations in administrative law were made 
possible only because the appellate review model, as Dickinson perceived, 
Judicial Review, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 505, 525-42 (1985) (examining evolution of hard look 
doctrine). 
289. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
290. Id. at 843 n.9, 845. 
291. Id. at 843 n.ll, 844-45. 
292. Rubin, supra note 3, at 142. I am not sure that this characterization is fully 
accurate insofar as Chevron applies to pure questions of law - when the statute is 
ambiguous - as well as questions of law application. Cf. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 
1172 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing courts hould 
decide "pure questions of statutory construction" while deferring to reasonable agency 
interpretations o  questions of "applying law to fact"). 
293. Dickinson, supra note 14, at 286-87 (endorsing idea of courts treating legal 
interpretations of the Land Office like questions of fact, on the ground that those issues 
fall within "a body of technical dministrative practice"). 
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rests on the general idea of a division of functions.294 As long as the 
model is understood at this level of generality, particular understandings 
of institutional functions and the line of demarcation between institu- 
tions can change over time, all the while permitting a basic continuity in 
the identity of the relevant institutions and the sequence with which they 
discharge their functions. Thus, the model has permitted the federal 
courts to respond to a variety of political imperatives and intellectual fash- 
ions without surrendering their position of dominance in the develop- 
ment of regulatory policy. 
Conclusion 
The adoption of the appellate review model for ordering the rela- 
tionship between agencies and courts was one of the most far-reaching 
developments in the history of American administrative law. The model 
had two great virtues, one political, the other conceptual. The political 
virtue was that it allowed the federal courts to back off from engaging in 
intensive de novo review of the nation's most important regulatory 
agency, the ICC. By 1906, the Court had gotten itself into hot water over 
micromanagement of the ICC. The appellate review model allowed the 
Court to increase the ratio of affirmances to reversals and develop a rhet- 
oric of deference while at the same time purporting to maintain con- 
tinuity with its past practice. Conceptually, the model permitted a genu- 
ine specialization of functions between courts and agencies, which 
reduced friction, delay, and duplication of effort. Agencies would spe- 
cialize in the nitty-gritty of their particular regulatory programs: develop- 
ing records, making findings of fact, crafting dispositional orders, initiat- 
ing enforcement actions. Courts would review the record to assure that 
agencies were acting in a reasonable fashion, and they would concentrate 
on conclusions of law in order to harmonize the agency regulatory pro- 
gram with broader principles of law, including constitutional rights such 
as the protection against confiscation. 
All this seems familiar and uncontroversial. But it is worth asking 
whether the division of functions generated by the appellate review 
model is in fact optimal given the characteristics of the institutions in- 
volved. As between judge and jury, few would argue that the jury should 
find the law and the judge should find the facts. But it is not self evident 
that the same holds true as between court and agency. Finding the law is 
closer to making policy than finding the facts, at least most of the time. 
And agencies, for reasons both of expertise and democratic accountabil- 
ity, are today generally regarded as the preferred policymaker. Kenneth 
Culp Davis made the point with characteristic bluntness in commenting 
294. See id. at 233-35 (noting that agency "must seek a practical solution of one case 
rather than a rule for all cases; and this requires that its determinations . . . must be subject 
ultimately to the check of an adjudicating body primarily interested ingeneral rules of 
delimitation between opposing rights"). 
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on Dickinson's conception of the judge as lawgiver: "[W]ho can best de- 
termine what the law should be as to the maximum amount of poison 
spray on fruit - a judge ... or the appropriate expert of the Department 
of Agriculture?"295 
One problem is that the appellate review model emerged during a 
time when agencies primarily engaged in adjudication and only rarely 
ventured into rulemaking. Agencies looked like the proverbial Article I 
court. Today, the pattern is close to the reverse, as many of the character- 
istic modern agencies, like the EPA, the FCC, and FERC, do most of their 
business through rulemaking and rarely engage in adjudication. Agen- 
cies today look more like a "junior-varsity Congress."296 In light of this 
role reversal, one could argue that the independent and impartial Article 
III judiciary should be assigned the primary task of determining the 
facts - at least adjudicative facts that pertain to particular parties in en- 
forcement actions - and agencies should be assigned the task of develop- 
ing legal principles through notice and comment rulemaking. Of course, 
the Chevron doctrine, if taken seriously, gets us at least part way to this 
result. But Chevron is a kind of patchwork solution jiggered on top of the 
appellate review model, and it seems to be at constant war with the under- 
lying premises of that model. The appellate review model tells courts to 
decide all questions of law independently, whereas Chevron interposes 
and instructs the court to hold off if there is reason to think that 
Congress has given the legal issues to the agency to decide. 
As a thought experiment, it is at least worth considering whether 
some other model for judicial review, such as the ultra vires or jurisdic- 
tional model, might have offered a superior architecture for allocating 
authority between agencies and courts. Much nineteenth-century review, 
especially under the prerogative writs, adopted this premise. Courts 
would not review an agency decision like a judge supervising a jury, but 
would ask whether the agency was acting within the scope of its jurisdic- 
tion as authorized by law. This reinforced the principle of legislative 
supremacy, in that the courts enforced the decisions of the legislature 
about the basic mandate and scope of authority of any agency created by 
statute. But oversight of individual decisions, including policy choices 
made within the scope of the agency's authority, was left to internal 
agency review mechanisms and the legislature. British courts (and many 
commonwealth courts) continued to develop the ultra vires review model 
into the twentieth century, with the result that review of agency action in 
Britain has generally been more deferential to administrative initiatives 
than is characteristic of American administrative law.297 
295. Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law § 8, at 33 n.103 (1st ed. 1951). 
296. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
297. See generally Judicial Review and the Constitution (Christopher Forsyth ed., 
2000) (providing variety of perspectives on the role of ultra vires review in British 
administrative law). 
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To be sure, as Dickinson also observed, the ultra vires review model, 
like the appellate review model, can expand and contract to reflect judi- 
cial confidence about the need for intervention. Some American courts 
following this mode of review, for example, held that a decision based on 
erroneous factual assumptions was beyond an agency's "jurisdiction."298 
And the British courts, in the late twentieth century, superadded review 
for procedural regularity and so-called Wednesbury review for "reasonable- 
ness" onto the basic model of ultra vires review, thereby reducing the 
distance between British and American courts in matters of administra- 
tive law.299 The potential for judicial aggrandizement is inherent in any 
model. 
Different models, however, orient courts in different ways, and they 
have a broad conditioning effect on the nature and direction of judicial 
review. An ultra vires model focuses attention of the reviewing court on 
questions of boundary maintenance. The basic question is always 
whether the agency has remained within the zone of discretion given to it 
by the legislature.300 The appellate review model invites courts to substi- 
tute their judgment for that of the agency on any matter that can be 
characterized as a question of "law." It is certainly plausible that the ultra 
vires approach would leave more "policy space" for agencies than the ap- 
pellate review model. As experience with agency government accumu- 
lates, powerful arguments can be made that, on the whole, this would 
have been a good thing.301 If some senator in 1906 had made an impas- 
sioned plea for amending the Interstate Commerce Act to incorporate an 
ultra vires standard of review, the American administrative state might 
298. See Dickinson, supra note 14, at 44-47, 309-13 (describing cases and their 
application to administrative law). 
299. See, e.g., Rv. Hull Univ. Visitor, [1993] A.C. 682 (H.L.) 701 (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (Lord Brown-Wilkinson) (arguing powers of public decisionmaking bodies "have 
been conferred on the decision maker on the underlying assumption that powers are to be 
exercised only within the jurisdiction conferred, inaccordance with fair procedures and, 
in a Wednesbury sense . . . reasonably" (citation omitted)). 
300. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I,Section 1: From Nondelegation to 
Exclusive Delegation, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2097, 2171-75 (2004) (arguing vital role of 
judicial review is to enforce limits on zone of discretion given to agency); Henry P. 
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 33-34 (1983) 
(emphasizing "boundary setting" role of courts injudicial review of agency action). 
301. Although the initial reaction to Chevron deference by law professors tended to be 
skeptical, recent books on statutory interpretation that adopt a more systemic, 
consequentalist perspective are united in their endorsement of strong Chevron- style 
deference to agency interpretations of statutes, albeit for different reasons. See, e.g., Frank 
B. Cross, The Theory and Practice of Statutory Interpretation 110-12 (2009) (arguing 
deference to agency interpretation promotes pragmatic nterpretation); Einer Elhauge, 
Statutory Default Rules: How to Interpret Unclear Legislation 9-10 (2008) (arguing 
deference to agencies is the primary means of assuring statutory interpretation tracks 
currendy "enactable preferences"); Vermeule, supra note 170, at 225-26 (arguing agencies 
have superior understanding of statutory purposes and empirical realities relative to 
reviewing courts). 
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look very different today, and regulatory policy might arguably be a good 
deal more coherent. 
This, of course, is wistful conjecture. The appellate review model is 
so deeply entrenched in American political culture that it is impossible to 
imagine wrenching free from its influence. The best that can be ex- 
pected is that courts, especially the Supreme Court, will continue to whit- 
de away at the scope of judicial authority over questions of policy, leaving 
courts the function of policing the boundaries of administrative action. 
The dominating influence of the appellate review model has made it 
much more difficult to arrive at this position. But having chosen that 
fork in the road, it is almost certainly impossible to go back and take 
another. 
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